to become formidable. At this time, besides,
Parliament and the whole judicial system was beginning
to take form; and many questions relating to the administration
of the towns, many disputes between the provosts and
burghers, were carried before the Parliament of Paris,
and there decided with more independence and equity
than they would have been by any other power.
A certain measure of impartiality is inherent in
judicial power; the habit of delivering judgment according
to written texts, of applying laws to facts, produces
a natural and almost instinctive respect for old-acquired
rights. In Parliament the towns often obtained
justice and the maintenance of their franchises against
the officers of the king. The collection of kingly
ordinances at this time abounds with instances of
the kind. These judges, besides, these bailiffs,
these provosts, these seneschals, and all these officers
of the king or of the great suzerains, formed before
long a numerous and powerful class. Now the
majority amongst them were burghers, and their number
and their power were turned to the advantage of burgherdom,
and led day by day to its further extension and importance.
Of all the original sources of the third estate,
this it is, perhaps, which has contributed most to
bring about the social preponderance of that order.
Just when burgherdom, but lately formed, was losing
in many of the communes a portion of its local liberties,
at that same moment it was seizing by the hand of
Parliaments, provosts, judges, and administrators
of all kinds, a large share of central power.
It was through burghers admitted into the king’s
service and acting as administrators or judges in
his name that communal independence and charters were
often attacked and abolished; but at the same time
they fortified and elevated burgherdom, they caused
it to acquire from day to day more wealth, more credit,
more importance and power in the internal and external
affairs of the state.
Philip the Handsome, that ambitious and despotic prince,
was under no delusion when in 1302, 1308, and 1314,
on convoking the first states-general of France,
he summoned thither “the deputies of the good
towns.” He did not yet give them the name
of third estate; but he was perfectly aware that he
was thus summoning to his aid against Boniface VIII.
and the Templars and the Flemings a class already
invested throughout the country with great influence
and ready to lend him efficient support. His
son, Philip the Long, was under no delusion when in
1317 and 1321 he summoned to the states-general “the
commonalties and good towns of the kingdom “to
decide upon the interpretation of the Salle law as
to the succession to the throne, “or to advise
as to the means of establishing a uniformity of coins,
weights, and measures;” he was perfectly aware
that the authority of burgherdom would be of great
assistance to him in the accomplishment of acts so
grave. And the three estates played the prelude
to the formation, painful and slow as it was, of constitutional
monarchy, when, in 1338, under Philip of Valois, they
declared, “in presence of the said king, Philip
of Valois, who assented thereto, that there should
be no power to impose or levy talliage in France if
urgent necessity or evident utility did not require
it, and then only by grant of the people of the estates.”