or else referred only to the particular tribes with which he was associated.  La Mothe says, “they have lost twenty-five people amongst different nations,” but as he was only speaking of the Upper Lake Indians, it may be that the total Indian loss was 25 plus 17, or 42.  McKee always understates the British force and loss, and greatly overstates the loss and force of the Americans.  In this letter he says that the Americans had 50 men killed, instead of 22; and that 60 “drivers” (packhorsemen) were taken and killed; whereas in reality 3 were taken and 2 killed.] of them had been killed, and a great number wounded; whereas they had only succeeded in killing one and wounding eleven of the garrison.  They were much disheartened at the check, and the Upper Lake Indians began to go home.  The savages were as fickle as they were ferocious:  and though terrible antagonists when fighting on their own ground and in their own manner, they lacked the stability necessary for undertaking a formidable offensive movement in mass.  This army of two thousand warriors, the largest they had ever assembled, was repulsed with loss in an attack on a wooden fort with a garrison not one sixth their strength, and then dissolved without accomplishing anything at all.

  Wayne Starts on his March. 
  Severity of Wayne’s Discipline.

Three weeks after the successful defence of Fort Recovery, Wayne was joined by a large force of mounted volunteers from Kentucky, under General Scott; and on July 27th he set out towards the Miami towns.  The Indians who watched his march brought word to the British that his army went twice as far in a day as St. Clair’s, that he kept his scouts well out and his troops always in open order and ready for battle; that he exercised the greatest precaution to avoid an ambush or surprise, and that every night the camps of the different regiments were surrounded by breastworks of fallen trees so as to render a sudden assault hopeless.  Wayne was determined to avoid the fates of Braddock and St. Clair.  His “legion” of regular troops, was over two thousand strong.  His discipline was very severe, yet he kept the loyal affection of his men.  He had made the officers devote much of their time to training the infantry in marksmanship and the use of the bayonet and the cavalry in the use of the sabre.  He impressed upon the cavalry and infantry alike that their safety lay in charging home with the utmost resolution.  By steady drill he had turned his force, which was originally not of a promising character, into as fine an army, for its size, as a general could wish to command.

    Excellence of his Troops.

The perfection of fighting capacity to which he had brought his forces caused much talk among the frontiersmen themselves.  One of the contingent of Tennessee militia wrote home in the highest praise of the horsemanship and swordsmanship of the cavalry, who galloped their horses at speed over any ground, and leaped them over formidable obstacles, and of the bayonet practice, and especially of the marksmanship, of the infantry.  He remarked that hunters were apt to undervalue the soldiers as marksmen, but that Wayne’s riflemen were as good shots as any hunters he had ever seen at any of the many matches he had attended in the backwoods. [Footnote:  Knoxville Gazette, August 27, 1793.]