Washington and his administration were not free from blame.  It was foolish to attempt the campaign the Northwestern Indians with men who had only been trained for six months, and who were enlisted at the absurd price of two dollars a month.  Moreover, there were needless delays in forwarding the troops to Fort Washington; and the commissary department was badly managed.  Washington was not directly responsible for any of these shortcomings; he very wisely left to the Secretary of War, Knox, the immediate control of the whole matter, seeking to avoid all interference with him, so that there might be no clashing or conflict of authority [Footnote:  State Dep.  MSS., Washington Papers.  War Dept.  Ex.  C., Washington to Knox, April 1, 1791.]; but he was of course ultimately responsible for the little evil, no less than for the great good, done by his administration.

    Incompetence of St. Clair.

The chief blunder was the selection of St. Clair.  As a commander he erred in many ways.  He did not, or could not, train his troops; and he had no business to challenge a death fight with raw levies.  It was unpardonable of him to send back one of his two regular regiments, the only trustworthy portion of his force, on the eve of the battle.  He should never have posted the militia, his poorest troops, in the most exposed situation.  Above all he should have seen that the patrols and pickets were so numerous, and performed their duty so faithfully, as to preclude the possibility of surprise.  With the kind of army furnished him he could hardly have won a victory under any circumstances; but the overwhelming nature of the defeat was mainly due to his incompetence.

CHAPTER II.

Mad Anthony Wayne; and the fight of the fallen Timbers, 1792-1795.

    Demoralization Caused by St. Clair’s Defeat.

The United States Government was almost as much demoralized by St. Clair’s defeat as was St. Clair’s own army.  The loosely-knit nation was very poor, and very loath to undertake any work which involved sustained effort and pecuniary sacrifice; while each section was jealous of every other and was unwilling to embark in any enterprise unlikely to inure to its own immediate benefit.  There was little national glory or reputation to be won by even a successful Indian war; while another defeat might prove a serious disaster to a government which was as yet far from firm in its seat.  The Eastern people were lukewarm about a war in which they had no direct interest; and the foolish frontiersmen, instead of backing up the administration, railed at it and persistently supported the party which desired so to limit the powers and energies of the National Government as to produce mere paralysis.  Under such conditions the national administration, instead of at once redoubling its efforts to ensure success by shock of arms, was driven to the ignoble necessity of yet again striving for a hopeless peace.