Raid of Scott.

Besides thus organizing the local militia for defense, the President authorized the Kentuckians to undertake two offensive expeditions against the Wabash Indians so as to prevent them from giving aid to the Miami tribes, whom St. Clair was to attack.  Both expeditions were carried on by bands of mounted volunteers, such as had followed Clark on his various raids.  The first was commanded by Brigadier-General Charles Scott; Colonel John Hardin led his advance guard, and Wilkinson was second in command.  Towards the end of May, Scott crossed the Ohio, at the head of eight hundred horse-riflemen, and marched rapidly and secretly towards the Wabash towns.  A mounted Indian discovered the advance of the Americans and gave the alarm; and so most of the Indians escaped just as the Kentucky riders fell on the town.  But little resistance was offered by the surprised and outnumbered savages.  Only five Americans were wounded, while of the Indians thirty-two were slain, as they fought or fled, and forty-one prisoners, chiefly women and children, were brought in, either by Scott himself or by his detachments under Hardin and Wilkinson.  Several towns were destroyed, and the crowing corn cut down.  There were not a few French living in the town, in well-finished log-houses, which were burned with the wigwams. [Footnote:  American State Papers, iv., 131, Scott’s Report, June 28, 1791.]

    Raid of Wilkinson.

The second expedition was under the command of Wilkinson, and consisted of over five hundred men.  He marched in August, and repeated Scott’s feats, again burning down two or three of the towns, and destroying the goods and the crops.  He lost three or four men killed or wounded, but killed ten Indians and captured some thirty. [Footnote:  Do., Wilkinson’s Letter, August 24, 1791.] In both expeditions the volunteers behaved well and committed no barbarous act, except that in the confusion of the actual onslaught two or three non-combatants were slain.  The Wabash Indians were cowed and disheartened by their punishment, and in consequence gave no aid to the Miami tribes; but beyond this the raids accomplished nothing, and brought no nearer the wished-for time of peace.

    St. Clair’s Difficulty in Organizing his Campaign.

Meanwhile St. Clair was striving vainly to hasten the preparations for his own far more formidable task.  There was much delay in forwarding him the men and the provisions and munitions.  Congress hesitated and debated; the Secretary of War, hampered by a newly created office and insufficient means, did not show to advantage in organizing the campaign, and was slow in carrying out his plans; while there was positive dereliction of duty on the part of the quartermaster, and the contractors proved both corrupt and inefficient.  The army was often on short commons, lacking alike food for the men and fodder for the horses; the powder was poor, the axes useless, the tents and clothing nearly worthless; while the delays were so extraordinary that the troops did not make the final move from Fort Washington until mid-September. [Footnote:  St. Clair Papers, II., 286, Report of Special Committee of Congress, March 27, 1792.]