The Winning of the West, Volume 3 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 328 pages of information about The Winning of the West, Volume 3.

The Winning of the West, Volume 3 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 328 pages of information about The Winning of the West, Volume 3.
in the fall of 1786, Jay in entire good faith had taken a step which aroused furious anger in the West. [Footnote:  State Dep.  MSS., No. 81, vol. ii., pp. 193, 241, 285, etc.; Reports of Sec’y John Jay.] Like so many other statesmen of the day, he did not realize how fast Kentucky had grown, and deemed the navigation question one which would not be of real importance to the West for two decades to come.  He absolutely refused to surrender our right to navigate the Mississippi; but, not regarding it as of immediate consequence, he proposed both to Congress and Gardoqui that in consideration of certain concessions by Spain we should agree to forbear to exercise this right for twenty or twenty-five years.  The delegates from the northern States assented to Jay’s views; those from the southern States strongly opposed them.  In 1787, after a series of conferences between Jay and Gardoqui, which came to naught, the Spaniard definitely refused to entertain Jay’s proposition.  Even had he not refused nothing could have been done, for under the confederation a treaty had to be ratified by the votes of nine States, and there were but seven which supported the policy of Jay.

    Washington and Lee agree with Jay.

Unquestionably Jay showed less than his usual far-sightedness in this matter, but it is only fair to remember that his views were shared by some of the greatest of American statesmen, even from Virginia.  “Lighthorse Harry” Lee substantially agreed with them.  Washington, with his customary broad vision and keen insight, realized the danger of exciting the turbulent Westerners by any actual treaty which might seem to cut off their hope of traffic down the Mississippi; but he advocated pursuing what was, except for defining the time limit, substantially the same policy under a different name, recommending that the United States should await events and for the moment neither relinquish nor push their claim to free navigation of the great river. [Footnote:  “The Spanish Conspiracy,” Thos.  Marshall Green, p. 31.] Even in Kentucky itself a few of the leading men were of the opinion that the right of free navigation would be of little real benefit during the lifetime of the existing generation. [Footnote:  State Dept.  MSS., Madison Papers, Caleb Wallace to Madison, Nov. 21, 1787.  Wallace himself shared this view.] It was no discredit to Jay to hold the views he did when they were shared by intelligent men of affairs who were actually in the district most concerned.  He was merely somewhat slow in abandoning opinions which half a dozen years before were held generally throughout the Union.  Nevertheless it was fortunate for the country that the southern States, headed by Virginia, were so resolute in their opposition, and that Gardoqui, a fit representative of his government, declined to agree to a treaty which if ratified would have benefited Spain, and would have brought undreamed of evil upon the United States.  Jefferson, to his credit, was very hostile to the proposition.  As a statesman Jefferson stood for many ideas which in their actual working have proved pernicious to our country, but he deserves well of all Americans, in the first place because of his services to science, and in the next place, what was of far more importance, because of his steadfast friendship for the great West, and his appreciation of its magnificent future.

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The Winning of the West, Volume 3 from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.