Harmar’s Expedition against the Miami Towns.

The main expedition was that against the Miami Indians, and was led by General Harmar himself.  It was arranged that there should be a nucleus of regular troops, but that the force should consist mainly of militia from Kentucky and Pennsylvania, the former furnishing twice as many as the latter.  The troops were to gather on the 15th of September at Fort Washington, on the north bank of the Ohio, a day’s journey down-stream from Limestone.

    Poor Quality of the Militia.

At the appointed time the militia began to straggle in; the regular officers had long been busy getting their own troops, artillery, and military stores in readiness.  The regulars felt the utmost disappointment at the appearance of the militia.  They numbered but few of the trained Indian fighters of the frontier; many of them were hired substitutes; most of them were entirely unacquainted with Indian warfare, and were new to the life of the wilderness; and they were badly armed. [Footnote:  American State Papers, Indian Affairs, vol. i., pp. 104, 105; Military Affairs, i., 20.] The Pennsylvanians were of even poorer stuff than the Kentuckians, numbering many infirm old men, and many mere boys.  They were undisciplined, with little regard for authority, and inclined to be disorderly and mutinous.

    The Army Assembles.

By the end of September one battalion of Pennsylvania, and three battalions of Kentucky, militia, had arrived, and the troops began their march to the Miami.  All told there were 1453 men, 320 being Federal troops and 1133 militia, many of whom were mounted; and there were three light brass field-pieces. [Footnote:  Do., Indian Affairs, i., p. 104; also p. 105.  For this expedition see also Military Affairs, i., pp. 20, 28, and Denny’s Military Journal, pp. 343, 354.] In point of numbers the force was amply sufficient for its work; but Harmar, though a gallant man, was not fitted to command even a small army against Indians, and the bulk of the militia, who composed nearly four-fifths of his force, were worthless.  A difficulty immediately occurred in choosing a commander for the militia.  Undoubtedly the best one among their officers was Colonel John Hardin, who (like his fellow Kentuckian, Colonel Scott), was a veteran of the Revolutionary War, and a man of experience in the innumerable deadly Indian skirmishes of the time.  He had no special qualifications for the command of more than a handful of troops, but he was a brave and honorable man, who had done well in leading small parties of rangers against their red foes.  Nevertheless, the militia threatened mutiny unless they were allowed to choose their own leader, and they chose a mere incompetent, a Colonel Trotter.  Harmar yielded, for the home authorities had dwelt much on the necessity of his preventing friction between the regulars and the militia; and he had so little control over the latter, that he was very anxious to keep them good-humored.  Moreover, the commissariat arrangements were poor.  Under such circumstances the keenest observers on the frontier foretold failure from the start. [Footnote:  Am.  State Papers, Indian Affairs, i.  Jno.  O’Fallan to the President, Lexington, Ky., Sept. 25, 1790.]