Thus the settlement of the Northwest was fairly begun, on a system hitherto untried.  The fates and the careers of all the mighty states which yet lay formless in the forest were in great measure determined by what was at this time done.  The nation had decreed that they should all have equal rights with the older States and with one another, and yet that they should remain forever inseparable from the Union; and above all, it had been settled that the bondman should be unknown within their borders.  Their founding represented the triumph of the principle of collective national action over the spirit of intense individualism displayed so commonly on the frontier.  The uncontrolled initiative of the individual, which was the chief force in the settlement of the Southwest, was given comparatively little play in the settlement of the Northwest.  The Northwest owed its existence to the action of the nation as a whole.

CHAPTER VII.

The War in the Northwest. 1787-1790

The Federal troops were camped in the Federal territory north of the Ohio.  They garrisoned the forts and patrolled between the little log-towns.  They were commanded by the Federal General Harmar, and the territory was ruled by the Federal Governor St. Clair.  Thenceforth the national authorities and the regular troops played the chief parts in the struggle for the Northwest.  The frontier militia became a mere adjunct—­often necessary, but always untrustworthy—­of the regular forces.

    The Regular Army in the Northwest.

For some time the regulars fared ill in the warfare with the savages; and a succession of mortifying failures closed with a defeat more ruinous than any which had been experienced since the days of the “iron-tempered general the pipe-clay brain,”—­for the disaster which befell St. Clair was as overwhelming as that wherein Braddock met his death.  The continued checks excited the anger of the Eastern people, and the dismay and derision of the Westerners.  They were keenly felt by the officers of the army; and they furnished an excuse for those who wished to jeer at regular troops, and exalt the militia.  Jefferson, who never understood anything about warfare, being a timid man, and who belonged to the visionary school which always denounced the army and navy, was given a legitimate excuse to criticise the tactics of the regulars; [Footnote:  Draper MSS., G. R. Clark Papers.  Jefferson to Innes, March 7, 1791.] and of course he never sought occasion to comment on the even worse failings of the militia.

    Shortcomings of the Regulars.