All eyes were now turned upon James, for it was felt that if the point was decided against him the case was lost.

“The point to which I wish you to address yourself, Mr. Short,” went on the learned Judge, “is—­Is the personality of Miss Smithers so totally lost and merged in what, for want of a better term I must call her documentary capacity, as to take away from her the right to appear before this Court like any other sane human being, and give evidence of events connected with its execution?”

“If your Lordship pleases,” said James, “I maintain that this is not so.  I maintain that the document remains the document; and that for all purposes, including the giving of evidence concerning its execution, Miss Smithers still remains Miss Smithers.  It would surely be absurd to argue that because a person has a deed executed upon her she was, ipso facto, incapacitated from giving evidence concerning it, on the mere ground that she was it.  Further, such a decision would be contrary to equity and good policy, for persons could not so lightly be deprived of their natural rights.  Also, in this case, the plaintiff’s action would be absolutely put an end to by any such decision, seeing that the signature of Jonathan Meeson and the attesting witnesses to the will could not, of course, be recognised in their tattooed form, and there is no other living person who could depose under what circumstances the signature came to be there.  I submit that the objection should be overruled.”

“This,” said his Lordship, in giving his decision “is a very curious point, and one which, when first raised by the learned Attorney-General, struck me with some force; but, on considering it and hearing Mr. Short, I am convinced that it is an objection that cannot be supported” (here Eustace gave a sigh of relief).  “It is argued on the part of the defendant that Miss Smithers is, for the purposes of this case a document, a document, and nothing but a document, and as such that her mouth is shut.  Now, I think that the learned Attorney-General cannot have thought this matter out when he came to that conclusion.  What are the circumstances?  A will is supposed to have been tattooed upon this lady’s skin; but is the skin the whole person?  Does not the intelligence remain, and the individuality?  I think that I can put what I mean more clearly by means of an illustration.  Let us suppose that I were to uphold the defendant’s objection, and that, as a consequence, the plaintiff’s case were to break down.  Then let us suppose that the plaintiff had persuaded the witness to be partially skinned”—­(here Augusta nearly jumped from her seat)—­“and that she, having survived the operation, was again tendered to the court as a witness, would the Court then be able, under any possibility, to refuse to accept her evidence?  The document, in the form of human parchment, would then be in the hands of the officers of the Court, and the person from whom the parchment had been removed,