But if we admit the very worst that the most searching critic of international finance can allege against the proposal that we imagine to be put forward by the Republic of Barataria—­if we admit that a loan to balance a deficit and pay for ships probably implies wastefulness, corruption, political rottenness, impecunious Chauvinism and all the rest of it, the question still arises whether it is the business of an issuing house to refuse the chance of doing good business for itself and for the London money-market, because it has reason to believe that the money lent will not be well spent.  In the case supposed, we have seen that the terms offered and the commission to be made by the intermediary were such that the latter would have been shown the door.  But if these matters had been satisfactory, ought the proposal to have been rejected because the loan was to be raised for unproductive purposes?

In other words, is it the business of an issuing house to take care of the economic morals of its clients, or is it merely concerned to see that the securities which it offers to the public are well secured?  In ordinary life, and in the relations between moneylender and borrower at home, no such question could be asked.  If I went to my banker and asked for a loan and gave him security that he thought good enough, it would not occur to him to ask what I was going to do with the money—­whether I was going to use it in a way that would increase my earning capacity, or on building myself a billiard room and a conservatory, or on a visit to Monte Carlo.  He would only be concerned with making sure that any of his depositors’ money that he lent to me would be repaid in due course, and the manner in which I used or abused the funds lent to me would be a question in which I only was concerned.  If it is the business of an international finance house to be more careful about the use to which money that it lends on behalf of clients is put, why should this be so?

There are several reasons.  First, because if the borrower does not see fit to pay interest on the loan or repay it when it falls due, there is no process of law by which the lender can recover.  If I borrow from my banker and then default on my debt, he can put me in the bankruptcy court, and sell me up.  Probably he will have protected himself by making me pledge securities that he can seize if I do not pay, a safeguard which cannot be had in the case of international borrowing; but if these securities are found to be of too little value to make the debt good, everything else that I own can be attached by him.  The international moneylender, on the other hand, if his debtor defaults may, if he is lucky, induce his Government to bring diplomatic pressure to bear, for whatever that may be worth.  If there is a political purpose to be served, as in Egypt, he may even find himself used as an excuse for armed intervention, in the course of which his claims will be supported, and made good.  In many cases, however, he and