the credibility of Miracles, their use and the evidences of them being only touched on subordinately and collaterally.  It was thought that such an aim, though in itself a narrow and confined one, was most adapted to the particular need of the day.

As Mr. Mozley says, various points essential to the whole argument, such as testimony, and the criterion between true and false miracles, are touched upon; but what is characteristic of the work is the way in which it deals with the antecedent objection to the possibility and credibility of miracles.  It is on this part of the subject that the writer strikes out a line for himself, and puts forth his strength.  His argument may be described generally as a plea for reason against imagination and the broad impressions of custom.  Experience, such experience as we have of the world and human life, has, in all ages, been really the mould of human thought, and with large exceptions, the main unconscious guide and controller of human belief; and in our own times it has been formally and scientifically recognised as such, and made the exclusive foundation of all possible philosophy.  A philosophy of mere experience is not tolerant of miracles; its doctrines exclude them; but, what is of even greater force than its doctrines, the subtle and penetrating atmosphere of feeling and intellectual habits which accompanies it is essentially uncongenial and hostile to them.  It is against the undue influence of such results of experience—­an influence openly acting in distinct ideas and arguments, but of which the greater portion operates blindly, insensibly, and out of sight—­that Mr. Mozley makes a stand on behalf of reason, to which it belongs in the last resort to judge of the lessons of experience.  Reason, as it cannot create experience, so it cannot take its place and be its substitute; but what reason can do is to say within what limits experience is paramount as a teacher; and reason abdicates its functions if it declines to do so, for it was given us to work upon and turn to account the unmeaning and brute materials which experience gives us in the rough.  The antecedent objection against miracles is, he says, one of experience, but not one of reason.  And experience, flowing over its boundaries tyrannically and effacing its limits, is as dangerous to truth and knowledge as reason once was, when it owned no check in nature, and used no test but itself.

Mr. Mozley begins by stating clearly the necessity for coming to a decision on the question of miracles.  It cannot remain one of the open questions, at least of religion.  There is, as has been said, a disposition to pass by it, and to construct a religion without miracles.  The thing is conceivable.  We can take what are as a matter of fact the moral results of Christianity, and of that singular power with which it has presided over the improvement of mankind, and alloying and qualifying them with other elements, not on the face of the matter its products, yet in