Having thus shown that the right of patronage, being originally purchased, may be legally transferred, and that it is now in the hands of lawful possessours, at least as certainly as any other right, we have left the advocates of the people no other plea than that of convenience.  Let us, therefore, now consider what the people would really gain by a general abolition of the right of patronage.  What is most to be desired by such a change is, that the country should be supplied with better ministers.  But why should we suppose that the parish will make a wiser choice than the patron?  If we suppose mankind actuated by interest, the patron is more likely to choose with caution, because he will suffer more by choosing wrong.  By the deficiencies of his minister, or by his vices, he is equally offended with the rest of the congregation; but he will have this reason more to lament them, that they will be imputed to his absurdity or corruption.  The qualifications of a minister are well known to be learning and piety.  Of his learning the patron is probably the only judge in the parish; and of his piety not less a judge than others; and is more likely to inquire minutely and diligently before he gives a presentation, than one of the parochial rabble, who can give nothing but a vote.  It may be urged, that though the parish might not choose better ministers, they would, at least, choose ministers whom they like better, and who would, therefore, officiate with greater efficacy.  That ignorance and perverseness should always obtain what they like, was never considered as the end of government; of which it is the great and standing benefit, that the wise see for the simple, and the regular act for the capricious.  But that this argument supposes the people capable of judging, and resolute to act according to their best judgments, though this be sufficiently absurd, it is not all its absurdity.  It supposes not only wisdom, but unanimity in those, who upon no other occasions are unanimous or wise.  If by some strange concurrence all the voices of a parish should unite in the choice of any single man, though I could not charge the patron with injustice for presenting a minister, I should censure him as unkind and injudicious.  But it is evident, that, as in all other popular elections, there will be contrariety of judgment and acrimony of passion; a parish upon every vacancy would break into factions, and the contest for the choice of a minister would set neighbours at variance, and bring discord into families.  The minister would be taught all the arts of a candidate, would flatter some, and bribe others; and the electors, as in all other cases, would call for holy-days and ale, and break the heads of each other during the jollity of the canvass.  The time must, however, come at last, when one of the factions must prevail, and one of the ministers get possession of the church.  On what terms does he enter upon his ministry, but those of enmity with half his parish?  By what prudence or what diligence