“You will recollect that what you will have to make is a successful march; that that march must not be delayed by any hazardous operations against Ghuznee or Cabul; that you should carefully calculate the time required to enable you to reach Jellalabad in the first week in October, so as to form the rearguard of Major-General Pollock’s army.  If you should be enabled by coup-de-main to get possession of Ghuznee and Cabul, you will act as you see fit, and leave decisive proofs of the power of the British army, without impeaching its humanity.  You will bring away from the tomb of Mahmood of Ghuznee, his club, which hangs over it; and you will bring away the gates of his tomb, which are the gates of the Temple of Somnauth. These will be the just trophies of your successful march.

“You will not fail to disguise your intention of moving, and to acquaint Major-General Pollock with your plans as soon as you have formed them. A copy of this letter will be forwarded to Major-General Pollock to-day; and he will be instructed, by a forward movement, to facilitate your advance; but he will probably not deem it necessary to move any troops actually to Cabul, where your force will be amply sufficient to beat any thing the Affghans can oppose to it.  The operations, however, of the two armies must be combined upon their approach, so as to effect, with the least possible loss, the occupation of Cabul, and keep open the communications between Cabul and Peshawar.

“One apprehension upon my mind is, that, in the event of your deciding upon moving on Jellalabad, by Ghuznee and Cabul, the accumulation of so great a force as that of your army, combined with Major-General Pollock’s, in the narrow valley of the Cabul river, may produce material difficulties in the matter of provisions and forage; but every effort will be made from India to diminish that difficulty, should you adopt that line of retirement.

“This letter remains absolutely secret.  I have, &c.

“ELLENBOROUGH.”

A paltry attempt was made in Parliament by Lord John Russell to represent this despatch as intended to defraud General Nott of his military trophies in the event of success, and to relieve the Governor-General of responsibility in the event of failure.  No such base construction can be put upon it.  Lord Ellenborough was doing his own duty as a civil minister, and leaving General Nott to do his as a military commander.  A military responsibility lay on General Nott, from which no ruler could relieve him; but the military glory was his also, if he felt himself justified in choosing the path of honour that was opened to him.  Who grudges the triumphs that General Nott and his companions-in-arms have achieved?  Not certainly Lord Ellenborough or his friends.  Let the distinctions which have been heaped on the Indian army and its leaders answer that question.  But is their military merit a reason for denying to the