What, then, must have been the feeling in India, in the very focus of this calamitous visitation?  Lord Auckland’s despatches, now made public, will tell us what he felt.  That he contemplated from the first the total and instant evacuation of Affghanistan, without attempting a blow for the vindication of our honour, or the release of the prisoners, is past all dispute, from documents under his own hand.  Whether he is to be blamed for this resolution, or for the state of matters which rendered it necessary, is not here the question.  But the fact is remarkable, as throwing further light on the effrontery of the Whigs.  Lord Palmerston, in last August, twitted the Ministry with Lord Ellenborough’s supposed intention to retire from beyond the Indus, and congratulated the country on the frustration of that intention, as having saved us “from the eternal disgrace.”  He was answered by the Prime Minister at the time in terms that might have been a warning, and that are now no longer a mystery.

“The noble lord presumed much on my forbearance, in what he said with respect to the Affghan war:  and I will not be betrayed by any language of his to forget what I owe to the public service in replying to him.  It is easy to say, why don’t you move troops to Candahar; and why don’t you move troops somewhere else?  The noble lord finds no difficulty in this; but does he recollect that 26,000 camels, carrying the baggage of the troops in Affghanistan, were sacrificed before they reached it?  The noble lord says, ’Who contemplated the abandonment of Affghanistan?’ I could tell the noble lord.  Beware, I say; let the noble lord beware of indiscriminate reflections upon those in office.”

It is now known “who contemplated the abandonment of Affghanistan,” without a struggle to punish the perfidy of the Affghans, to avenge the insults to our honour, or to redress the wrongs of our countrymen.  Lord Auckland resolved on this course, without even an aspiration after any thing better than a safe retreat.  Nor is such a resolution to be wondered at when the state of our military preparations is considered.  A letter from Sir Jasper Nicolls, of 24th January 1842, to the statements in which we see no contradiction in the Blue Book, exhibits at once the condition of our resources, and the feelings of the head of the Indian army.

“After I had dispatched my letter to your Lordship in Council, I received the note, of which I transmit a copy herewith, from the Adjutant-General, and I had a second discussion with Mr. Clerk on the subject of holding our ground at Jellalabad against any Affghan power or force, in view to retrieving our position at Cabul, by advancing upon it, at the fit season, simultaneously from Candahar to Jellalabad.  Having thus regained our position, and the influence which such proof of power must give, not only in Affghanistan but amongst all the neighbouring states, we should withdraw with dignity and undiminished honour.