us, but you must not speak or write about the land of Aden again.”  The English agent, however, persisted in speaking of the transfer as already legally concluded, and out of the power of Hamed to repudiate or annul:  while, in order to give greater stringency to his remonstrances, he gave orders for the detention of the date-boats and other vessels which arrived off Aden, hoping to starve the Sultan into submission, by thus at once stopping his provisions, and cutting off his receipt of port dues.  The blockade does not seem to have been very effectual:  and an overture from the Futhali chief to aid with his tribe in an attack on the Abdallis, was of course declined by Captain Haines.

[Footnote 46:  “Their first exclamation was, ’Are the English so poor that they can only afford to send one vessel? and is she only come to talk?  Why did they not send her before?  Had they sent their men and vessels, we would have given up; but until they do, they shall never have the place.’”—­CAPTAIN HAINES’S Despatch, Nov. 6, (No. 61.)]

The apparently interminable cross fire of protocols [47] (in which both Captain Haines and his employers appear to have luxuriated to a degree which would have gladdened the heart of Lord Palmerston himself) was now, however, on the point of being brought to a close.  On the 20th of November, one of the Coote’s boats, while engaged in overhauling an Arab vessel near the shore, was fired at by the Bedoweens on the beach, and hostilities were carried on during several days, but with little damage on either side.  In most cases, it would have been considered that blockading a port, and intercepting its supplies of provisions constituted a sufficiently legitimate ground of warfare to justify these reprisals:  but Captain Haines, it appears, thought otherwise, as he stigmatizes it as “a shameful and cowardly attack,” and becomes urgent with the Bombay government for a reinforcement which might enable him to assume offensive operations with effect.  Her Majesty’s ships Volage, 28, and Cruiser, 16 gun-brig, which had been employed in some operations about the mouth of the Indus, were accordingly ordered on this service, and sailed from Bombay December 29, accompanied by two transports conveying about 800 troops—­Europeans, sepoys, and artillerymen—­under the command-in-chief of Major Baillie, 24th Bombay native infantry.  The Abdalli chiefs, on the other hand, made an effort to induce the Sultan of the Futhalis, (with whom they held a conference during the first days of 1839, at the tomb of Sheikh Othman near Aden, on the occasion of the payment of the annual tribute above referred to,) to make common cause with them against the intruders who were endeavouring to establish themselves in the country; but the negotiation wholly failed, and the two parties separated on not very amicable terms.

[Footnote 47:  It is worthy of remark, that in a note of December 1st, (Corresp.  No. 81,) from the Governor of Bombay to the Sultan, the ill treatment of the passengers of the Derya-Dowlut is again advanced as the ground of offence, as an atonement for which the cession of Aden is indispensable; though for this, ample satisfaction had been admitted long since to have been given.]