leadership was most important for the Confederacy.
It was the obstinacy of Davis that had protracted the
War through the winter and spring of 1865, long after
it was evident from the reports of Lee and of the
other commanders that the resources of the Confederacy
were exhausted and that any further struggle simply
meant an inexcusable loss of life on both sides.
As a Northern soldier who has had experience in Southern
prisons, I may be excused also from bearing in mind
the fearful responsibility that rests upon Davis for
the mismanagement of those prisons, a mismanagement
which caused the death of thousands of brave men on
the frozen slopes of Belle Isle, on the foul floors
of Libby and Danville, and on the rotten ground used
for three years as a living place and as a dying place
within the stockade at Andersonville. Davis received
from month to month the reports of the conditions
in these and in the other prisons of the Confederacy.
Davis could not have been unaware of the stupidity
and the brutality of keeping prisoners in Richmond
during the last winter of the War when the lines of
road still open were absolutely inadequate to supply
the troops in the trenches or the people of the town.
Reports were brought to Davis more than once from
Andersonville showing that a large portion of the
deaths that were there occurring were due to the vile
and rotten condition of the hollow in which for years
prisoners had been huddled together; but the appeal
made to Richmond for permission to move the stockade
to a clean and dry slope was put to one side as a matter
of no importance. The entire authority in the
matter was in the hands of Davis and a word from him
would have remedied some of the worst conditions.
He must share with General Winder, the immediate superintendent
of the prisons, the responsibility for the heedless
and brutal mismanagement,—a mismanagement
which brought death to thousands and which left thousands
of others cripples for life.
As a result of the informal word given by Lincoln,
it was generally understood, by all the officers,
at least, in charge of posts and picket lines along
the eastern slope, that Davis was not to be captured.
Unfortunately it had not proved possible to get this
informal expression of a very important piece of policy
conveyed throughout the lines farther west. An
enterprising and over-zealous captain of cavalry,
riding across from the Mississippi to the coast, heard
of Davis’s party in Florida and, “butting
in,” captured, on May 10th, “the white
elephant.”
The last commands of the Confederate army were surrendered
with General Taylor in Louisiana on the 4th of May
and with Kirby Smith in Texas on the 26th of May.
As Lincoln had foreshadowed, not a few complications
resulted from this unfortunate capture of Davis, complications
that were needlessly added to by the lack of clear-headedness
or of definite policy on the part of a confused and
vacillating President. During the months in which