eleven days after the death of Lincoln.  Johnston’s troops, like those of Lee, were distributed to their homes.  The officers retained their side-arms, and the men, leaving their rifles, took with them not only such horses and mules as they still had with them connected with the cavalry or artillery, but also a number of horses and mules which had been captured by Sherman’s army and which had not yet been placed on the United States army roster.  Sherman understood, as did Grant, the importance of giving to these poor farmers whatever facilities might be available to enable them again to begin their home work.  Word was at once sent to General Johnston after Grant’s departure that the, only terms that could be considered was a surrender of the army, and that the details of such surrender Sherman would himself arrange with Johnston.  Reagan slipped away southward and is not further heard of in history.

The record of Lincoln’s relations to the events of the War would not be complete without a reference to the capture of Jefferson Davis.  On returning to Washington after his visit to Richmond, Lincoln had been asked what should be done with Davis when he was captured.  The answer was characteristic:  “I do not see,” said Lincoln, “that we have any use for a white elephant.”  Lincoln’s clear judgment had at once recognised the difficulties that would arise in case Davis should become a prisoner.  The question as to the treatment of the ruler of the late Confederacy was very different from, and much more complicated than, the fixing of terms of surrender for the Confederate armies.  If Davis had succeeded in getting out of the country, it is probable that the South, or at least a large portion of the South, would have used him as a kind of a scapegoat.  Many of the Confederate soldiers were indignant with Davis for his bitter animosities to some of their best leaders.  Davis was a capable man and had in him the elements of statesmanship.  He was, however, vain and, like some other vain men, placed the most importance upon the capacities in which he was the least effective.  He had had a brief and creditable military experience, serving as a lieutenant with Scott’s army in Mexico, and he had impressed himself with the belief that he was a great commander.  Partly on this ground, and partly apparently as a result of general “incompatibility of temper,” Davis managed to quarrel at different times during the War with some of the generals who had shown themselves the most capable and the most serviceable.  He would probably have quarrelled with Lee, if it had been possible for any one to make quarrel relations with that fine-natured gentleman, and if Lee had not been too strongly entrenched in the hearts of his countrymen to make any interference with him unwise, even for the President.  Davis had, however, managed to interfere very seriously with the operations of men like Beauregard, Sidney Johnson, Joseph Johnston, and other commanders whose continued