General Pope had, as a result of his defeat at the second Bull Run, in July, 1862, lost the confidence of the President and of the country.  The defeat alone would not necessarily have undermined his reputation, which had been that of an effective soldier.  He had, however, the fatal quality, too common with active Americans, of talking too much, whether in speech or in the written word, of promising things that did not come off, and of emphasising his high opinion of his own capacity.  Under the pressure of the new peril indicated by the presence of Lee’s troops within a few miles of the capital, Lincoln put to one side his own grave doubts in regard to the effectiveness and trustworthiness of McClellan and gave McClellan one further opportunity to prove his ability as a soldier.  The personal reflections and aspersions against his Commander-in-chief of which McClellan had been guilty, weighed with Lincoln not at all; the President’s sole thought was at this time, as always, how with the material available could the country best be served.

McClellan had his chance (and to few men is it given to have more than one great opportunity) and again he threw it away.  His army was stronger than that of Lee and he had the advantage of position and (for the first time against this particular antagonist) of nearness to his base of supplies.  Lee had been compelled to divide his army in order to get it promptly into position on the north side of the Potomac.  McClellan’s tardiness sacrificed Harper’s Ferry (which, on September 15th, was actually surrounded by Lee’s advance) with the loss of twelve thousand prisoners.  Through an exceptional piece of good fortune, there came into McClellan’s hands a despatch showing the actual position of the different divisions of Lee’s army and giving evidence that the two wings were so far separated that they could not be brought together within twenty-four hours.  The history now makes clear that for twenty-four hours McClellan had the safety of Lee’s army in his hands, but those precious hours were spent by McClellan in “getting ready,” that is to say, in vacillating.

Finally, there came the trifling success at South Mountain and the drawn battle of Antietam.  Lee’s army was permitted to recross the Potomac with all its trains and even with the captured prisoners, and McClellan lay waiting through the weeks for something to turn up.

A letter written by Lincoln on the 13th of October shows a wonderfully accurate understanding of military conditions, and throws light also upon the character and the methods of thought of the two men: 

“Are you not overcautious when you assume that you cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing?  Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim?  As I understand, you telegraphed General Halleck that you cannot subsist your army at Winchester unless the railroad from Harper’s Ferry to that point be put in working order.  But the enemy