Are the Arab-speaking peoples, therefore, likely to revolt, or be successful in splitting the Ottoman Empire, if they do?  The present writer would like to say, in parenthesis, that, in his opinion, this consummation of the empire is not devoutly to be wished.  The substitution of Arab administration for Osmanli would necessarily entail European tutelage of the parts of the Arab-speaking area in which powers, like ourselves, have vital interests—­Syria, for example, southern Mesopotamia, and, probably, Hejaz.  The last named, in particular, would involve us in so ticklish and thankless a task, that one can only be thankful for the Turkish caretaker there to-day, and loth to see him dismissed.

An Arab revolt, however, might break out whether the Triple Entente desired its success or not.  What chance of success would it have?  The peoples of the Arab part of the Ottoman Empire are a congeries of differing races, creeds, sects, and social systems, with no common bond except language.  The physical character of their land compels a good third of them to be nomadic, predatory barbarians, feared by the other two-thirds.  The settled folk are divided into Moslem and Christian (not to mention a large Jewish element), the cleavage being more abrupt than in western Turkey and the tradition and actual spirit of mutual enmity more separative.  Further, each of those main creed-divisions is subdivided.  Even Islam in this region includes a number of incompatible sects, such as the Ansariye, the Metawali, and the Druses in the Syrian mountains, Shiite Arabs on the Gulf coast and the Persian border, with pagan Kurds and Yezidis in the latter region and north Mesopotamia.  As for the Christians, their divisions are notorious, most of these being subdivided again into two or more hostile communions apiece.  It is almost impossible to imagine the inhabitants of Syria concerting a common plan or taking common action.  The only elements among them which have shown any political sense or capacity for political organization are Christian.  The Maronites of the Lebanon are most conspicuous among these; but neither their numbers nor their traditional relations with their neighbours qualify them to form the nucleus of a free united Syria.  The ‘Arab Movement’ up to the present has consisted in little more than talk and journalese.  It has not developed any considerable organization to meet that stable efficient organization which the Committee of Union and Progress has directed throughout the Ottoman dominions.

As for the rest of the empire, Asia Minor will stand by the Osmanli cause, even if Europe and Constantinople, and even if the Holy Places and all the Arab-speaking provinces be lost.  Its allegiance does not depend on either the tradition of Roum or the caliphate, but on essential unity with the Osmanli nation.  Asia Minor is the nation.  There, prepared equally by Byzantine domination and by Seljukian influence, the great mass of the people long ago identified itself