type, containing the declaration that the right of property in slaves is “before and higher than any constitutional sanction,” it made the right to vote upon it depend on the one hand on a test oath to “support this constitution” in order to repel conscientious free-State voters, and on the other hand on mere inhabitancy on the day of election to attract nomadic Missourians; it postponed the right to amend or alter for a period of seven years; it kept the then existing territorial laws in force until abrogated by State legislation; it adopted the late Oxford fraud as a basis of apportionment; it gave to Calhoun, the presiding officer, power to designate the precincts, the judges of election, and to decide finally upon the returns in the vote upon it, besides many other questionable or inadmissible provisions.  Finally the form of submission to popular vote to be taken on the 21st of December was prescribed to be, “constitution with slavery” or “constitution with no slavery,” thus compelling the adoption of the constitution in any event.

  [Sidenote] Walker, Testimony, Report Covode Committee, p. 110.

  [Sidenote] Martin, Testimony, Report Covode Committee, p. 159.

  [Sidenote] Ibid., pp. 170-1.

There is a personal and political mystery underlying this transaction which history will probably never solve.  Only a few points of information have come to light, and they serve to embarrass rather than aid the solution.  The first is that Calhoun, although the friend and protege of Douglas, and also himself personally pledged to submission, came to the Governor and urged him to join in the new programme as to slavery,—­alleging that the Administration had changed its policy, and now favored this plan,—­and tempted Walker with a prospect of the Presidency if he would concur.  Walker declared such a change impossible, and indignantly spurned the proposal.  The second is that one Martin, a department clerk, was, after confidential instructions from Secretary Thompson and Secretary Cobb, of Buchanan’s Cabinet, sent to Kansas in October, ostensibly on department business; that he spent his time in the lobby and the secret caucuses of the convention.  Martin testifies that these Cabinet members favored submission, but that Thompson wished it understood that he was unwilling to oppose the admission of Kansas “if a pro-slavery constitution should be made and sent directly to Congress by the convention.”  A wink was as good as a nod with that body, or rather with the cabal which controlled it; and after a virtuous dumb-show of opposition, it made a pretense of yielding to the inevitable, and acted on the official suggestion.  This theory is the more plausible because Martin testifies further that he himself drafted the slavery provision which was finally adopted.  The third point is that the President inexcusably abandoned his pledges to the Governor and adopted this Cobb-Thompson-Calhoun contrivance, instead of keeping his word and dismissing