[Sidenote] Wayne, J., Opinion in the Dred Scott case, 19 Howard,
  pp. 454-5.

The judges were, after all, but men.  They dined, they talked, they exchanged daily personal and social courtesies with the political world.  Curiosity, friendship, patriotism, led them to the floors of Congress to listen to the great debates.  Official ceremony called them into the presence of the President, of legislators, of diplomats.  They were feasted, flattered, questioned, reminded of their great opportunity, tempted with the suggestion of their supreme authority.[4] They could render their names illustrious.  They could honor their States.  They could do justice to the South.  They could perpetuate their party.  They could settle the slavery question.  They could end sectional hatred, extinguish civil war, preserve the Union, save their country.  Advanced age, physical feebleness, party bias, the political ardor of the youngest and the satiety of the eldest, all conspired to draw them under the insidious influence of such considerations.  One of the judges in official language frankly avowed the motive and object of the majority of the court.  “The case,” he wrote, “involves private rights of value, and constitutional principles of the highest importance, about which there had become such a difference of opinion that the peace and harmony of the country required the settlement of them by judicial decision.”  This language betrays the confusion of ideas and misconception of authority which tempted the judges beyond their proper duty.  Required only to decide a question of private rights, they thrust themselves forward to sit as umpires in a quarrel of parties and factions.

  [Sidenote] Campbell to Tyler, Tyler, p. 384.

  [Sidenote] Nelson to Tyler, Tyler, p. 385.

In an evil hour they yielded to the demands of “public interest,” and resolved to “fulfill public expectation.”  Justice Wayne “proposed that the Chief-Justice should write an opinion on all of the questions as the opinion of the court.  This was assented to, some reserving to themselves to qualify their assent as the opinion might require.  Others of the court proposed to have no question, save one, discussed.”  The extraordinary proceeding was calculated to touch the pride of Justice Nelson.  He appears to have given it a kind of sullen acquiescence.  “I was not present,” he wrote, “when the majority decided to change the ground of the decision, and assigned the preparation of the opinion to the Chief-Justice; and when advised of the change I simply gave notice that I should read the opinion I had prepared as my own, and which is the one on file.”  From this time the pens of other judges were busy, and in the inner political circles of Washington the case of Dred Scott gradually became a shadowy and portentous cause celebre.