but the opinions afterwards published indicate that the political aspects of slavery, which were then convulsing the country, from the very first found a certain sympathy and reflection in these grave judicial deliberations.  The discussions yet turned upon certain merely technical rules to be applied to the pleadings under review; and ostensibly to give time for further examination, the case was postponed and a re-argument ordered for the next term.  It may, however, be suspected that the nearness of the Presidential election had more to do with this postponement than did the exigencies of the law.[3]

[Illustration:  Roger B. Taney.]

The Presidential election came, and Mr. Buchanan was chosen.  Soon after, the court met to begin its long winter term; and about the middle of December, 1856, the Dred Scott case was once more elaborately argued.  Again occupying the attention of the court for four successive days, as it had also done in the first hearing, the eminent counsel, after passing lightly over mere technical subtleties, discussed very fully what was acknowledged to be the leading point in the controversy; namely, whether Congress had power under the Constitution to prohibit slavery in the Federal Territories, as it had done by the Missouri Compromise act and various other laws.  It was precisely the policy, or impolicy, of this and similar prohibitions which formed the subject of contention in party politics.  The question of their constitutional validity was certain to take even a higher rank in public interest.

When after the second argument the judges took up the case in conference for decision, the majority held that the judgment of the Missouri Federal tribunal should simply be affirmed on its merits.  In conformity to this view, Justice Nelson was instructed to prepare an opinion to be read as the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States.  Such a paper was thereupon duly written by him, of the following import:  It was a question, he thought, whether a temporary residence in a free-State or Territory could work the emancipation of a slave.  It was the exclusive province of each State, by its Legislature or courts of justice, to determine this question for itself.  This determined, the Federal courts were bound to follow the State’s decision.  The Supreme Court of Missouri had decided Dred Scott to be a slave.  In two cases tried since, the same judgment had been given.  Though former decisions had been otherwise, this must now be admitted as “the settled law of the State,” which, he said, “is conclusive of the case in this court.”

This very narrow treatment of the points at issue, having to do with the mere lifeless machinery of the law, was strikingly criticised in the dissenting opinion afterwards read by Justice McLean, a part of which, by way of anticipation, may properly be quoted here.  He denied that it was exclusively a Missouri question.

  [Sidenote] 19 Howard, pp. 555-64.