admission of California, he proclaimed the “higher law” doctrine in 1850;[1] reviewing Dred Scott and Lecompton, he announced the “irrepressible conflict” in 1858.[2] He had tact as well as talent; he was a consummate politician, as well as a profound statesman.  Such a leader could not fail of a strong following, and his supporters came to Chicago in such numbers, and of such prominence and character, as seemed to make his nomination a foregone conclusion.  The delegation from New York, headed by William M. Evarts, worked and voted throughout as a unit for him, not merely to carry out their constituents’ wishes, but with, a personal zeal that omitted no exertion or sacrifice.  They showed a want of tact, however, in carrying their street demonstrations for their favorite to excess; they crowded together at the Richmond House, making that hotel the Seward headquarters; with too much ostentation they marched every day to the convention with music and banners; and when mention was made of doubtful States, their more headlong members talked altogether too much of the campaign funds they intended to raise.  All this occasioned a reaction—­a certain mental protest among both Eastern and Western delegates against what have come to be characterized as “machine” methods.

The positive elements in Seward’s character and career had developed, as always happens, strong antagonisms.  One of the earliest symptoms among the delegates at Chicago was the existence of a strong undercurrent of opposition to his nomination.  This opposition was as yet latent, and scattered here and there among many State delegations, but very intense, silently watching its opportunity, and ready to combine upon any of the other candidates.  The opposition soon made a discovery:  that of all the names mentioned, Lincoln’s was the only one offering any chance for such a combination.  It needed only the slightest comparison of notes to show that Dayton had no strength save the New Jersey vote; Chase little outside of the Ohio delegation; Cameron none but that of Pennsylvania, and that Bates had only his Missouri friends and a few in border slave-States, which could cast no electoral vote for the Republicans.  The policy of the anti-Seward delegates was therefore quickly developed—­to use Lincoln’s popularity as a means to defeat Seward.

The credit of the nomination is claimed by many men, and by several delegations, but every such claim is wholly fictitious.  Lincoln was chosen not by personal intrigue, but through political necessity.  The Republican party was a purely defensive organization; the South had created the crisis which the new party was compelled to overcome.  The ascendency of the free-States, not the personal fortunes of Seward, hung in the balance.  Political victory at the ballot-box or a transformation of the institutions of government was the immediate alternative before the free-States.