The majority report[1] planted itself squarely upon the property theory and Congressional protection.  Mr. Avery, of North Carolina, said it was presented in the name of 17 States with 127 electoral votes, every one of which would be cast for the nominee.  He argued that in occupying new Territories Southern men could not compete with emigrant-aid societies at the North.  These could send a voter to the Territories for the sum of $200, while it would cost a Southern man $1500.  Secure political power by emigration, and permit the Territorial Legislatures to decide the slavery question, and the South would be excluded as effectually as by the Wilmot proviso.  Cuba must be acquired, and the flag of this great country must float over Mexico and the Central American States.  But if you apply this doctrine of popular sovereignty, and establish a cordon of free-States from the Pacific to the Atlantic, where in the future are the South to emigrate?  They asked the equal right to emigrate with their property, and protection from Congress during the Territorial condition.  They would leave it to the people in convention assembled, when framing a State constitution, to determine the question of slavery for themselves.  They had no purpose but to have a vexed question settled, and to put the Democratic party on a clear unclouded platform, not a doubled-faced one—­one face to the North and one face to the South.

Henry B. Payne, of Ohio, presented and defended the report of the minority.[2] It asserted that all questions in regard to property in States or Territories were judicial in their character, and that the Democratic party would abide by past and future decisions of the Supreme Court concerning them.  Mr. Payne explained that while the majority report was supported by 15 slave and two free-States,[3] representing 127 electoral votes, the minority report was indorsed by 15 free-States,[4] representing 176 electoral votes.  He argued that, by the universal consent of the Democratic party, the Cincinnati platform referred this question of slavery to the people of the Territories, declaring that Congress should in no event intervene one way or the other, and that all controversies should be settled by the courts.  Now the proposition of the majority report was to make a complete retraction of those two cardinal doctrines of the Cincinnati platform.  The Northern mind had become thoroughly imbued with this great doctrine of popular sovereignty.  You could not tear it out of their hearts unless you tore out their heart-strings themselves.  “I repeat, that upon this question of Congressional non-intervention we are committed by the acts of Congress, we are committed by the acts of National Democratic Conventions; we cannot recede without personal dishonor, and, so help us God, we never will recede!”

Between these extremes of recommendation another member of the platform committee—­Benjamin F. Butler, of Massachusetts—­proposed a middle course.  He advocated the simple reaffirmance of the Cincinnati platform.  If it had suffered a double interpretation, so had the Bible and the Constitution of the United States.  But beyond serving to consume time and amuse the convention, Mr. Butler’s speech made no impression.  The real tournament of debate followed, between William L. Yancey, of Alabama, and Senator George E. Pugh, of Ohio.