Adams, of course, knew quite well that such matters did not settle themselves, but he seems to have imagined that all he had to do was to sit tight and that matters would have to come his way.  The tricky and shuffling behavior to which he descended would be unbelievable of a man of his standing were there not an authentic record made by himself.  The suspense finally became so intolerable that the Cabinet acted without consulting the President any longer on the point.  The Secretary of War submitted to his colleagues all the correspondence in the case and asked their advice.  The Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, and of the Navy made a joint reply declaring “the only inference which we can draw from the facts before stated, is, that the President consents to the arrangement of rank as proposed by General Washington,” and that therefore “the Secretary of War ought to transmit the commissions, and inform the generals that in his opinion the rank is definitely settled according to the original arrangement.”  This was done; but Knox declined an appointment ranking him below Hamilton and Pinckney.  Thus, Adams despite his obstinacy, was completely baffled, and a bitter feud between him and his Cabinet was added to the causes now at work to destroy the Federalist party.

The Federalist military measures were sound and judicious, and the expense, although a subject of bitter denunciation, was really trivial in comparison with the national value of the enhanced respect and consideration obtained for American interests.  But these measures were followed by imprudent acts for regulating domestic politics.  By the Act of June 18,1798, the period of residence required before an alien could be admitted to American citizenship was raised from five years to fourteen.  By the Act of June 25, 1798, the efficacy of which was limited to two years, the President might send out of the country “such aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States, or shall have reasonable grounds to suspect are concerned in any treasonable or secret machinations against the government thereof.”  The state of public opinion might then have sanctioned these measures had they stood alone, but they were connected with another which proved to be the weight that pulled them all down.  By the Act of July 14, 1798, it was made a crime to write or publish “any false, scandalous, and malicious” statements about the President or either House of Congress, to bring them “into contempt or disrepute,” or to “stir up sedition within the United States.”

There were plenty of precedents in English history for legislation of such character.  Robust examples of it were supplied in England at that very time.  There were also strong colonial precedents.  According to Secretary Wolcott, the sedition law was “merely a copy from a statute of Virginia in October, 1776.”  But a revolutionary Whig measure aimed at Tories was a very different thing in its practical aspect from the same measure used by a national party against a constitutional opposition.  Hamilton regarded such legislation as impolitic, and, on hearing of the sedition bill, he wrote a protesting letter, saying, “Let us not establish tyranny.  Energy is a very different thing from violence.”