Hamilton, although out of the Cabinet, still remained a trusted adviser, and he rendered splendid service at a dangerous crisis.  In spite of the fact that the Jay treaty had been ratified by the Senate in June, 1795, it was an issue in the Fall elections that year.  Jefferson held that the treaty was an “execrable thing,” an “infamous act, which is really nothing more than a treaty of alliance between England and the Anglo-men of this country against the Legislature and the people of the United States.”  Giles, who had been in close consultation with Jefferson, moved with characteristic energy to translate Jefferson’s views into congressional action.

The Fourth Congress met on December 7, 1795, and although a Federalist, Jonathan Dayton of New Jersey was elected Speaker, the Republicans were strong enough to tone down the reply to the President’s address by substituting for an expression of “undiminished confidence” an acknowledgment of “zealous and faithful services,” which expressed “approval of his course.”  On March 24, 1796, the House by a vote of 62 to 37 adopted a resolution calling upon the President to lay before it his instructions to Jay, “together with the correspondence and the other documents relative to said treaty.”  Advised by Hamilton and sustained by his whole Cabinet, Washington replied on March 30, by declining to comply because concurrence of the House was not necessary to give validity to the treaty, and “because of the necessity of maintaining the boundaries fixed by the Constitution between the different departments.”  The House retorted by a resolution declaring its right to judge the merits of the case when application was made for an appropriation to give effect to a treaty.  Debate on this issue, which is still an open one in our constitutional system, began on April 14 and continued for sixteen days.  Madison opposed the execution of the treaty, but the principal speech was made by Giles, whose argument covers twenty-eight columns in the Annals.  As the struggle proceeded, the Jeffersonians lost ground.  It became evident that weighty elements of public opinion were veering around to the support of the treaty as the best arrangement attainable in the circumstances.  The balance of strength became so close that the scales were probably turned by a speech of wonderful power and eloquence delivered by Fisher Ames.  A decision was reached on April 30, the test question being on declaring the treaty “highly objectionable.”  Forty-eight votes were cast on each side and the Speaker gave his decision for the negative.  In the end, the House stood 51 to 48 in favor of carrying the treaty into effect.  Only four votes for the treaty came from the section south of Mason and Dixon’s line.