In pursuance of his principle of bringing “good-natured wisdom” to bear, Jay suggested to Lord Grenville, the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that they should dispense with written communications, and merely meet and converse informally “until there should appear a probability of coming to some amicable mutual understanding.”  Even after such understanding should be put into writing, it was not to be regarded as official or binding, but simply as an exchange of private memoranda.  So strictly was this informal method adhered to that the regular force of secretaries and copyists had nothing to do with the proceedings until the treaty was almost ready for signing.  Jay had been instructed to demand compensation for some three thousand slaves who had followed the British troops when they departed, but Lord Grenville stood firm on the principle that the slave, once under the British flag, became a free man, the property rights of the former owner thereupon becoming extinct and not forming a subject for compensation.  Jay, who really held the same opinion, had to yield the point.  It was agreed that the western posts should be evacuated by June 1, 1796, an arrangement which would allow the British government to retain them about two years longer.  That government had already justified its retention of these posts by averring that the United States had not complied with the articles of the peace treaty relating to British debts.  Jay was not in a position to argue the point with any force, for when he was Secretary of Foreign Affairs he had advised Congress that these articles “have been constantly violated on our part by legislative acts, then and still existing and operating”; and that Great Britain was therefore not to blame for retaining the posts.  The British government was undoubtedly cognizant of this report, and Jay could not make any effective opposition to a proviso which in effect said to the United States, “before surrendering the posts we will wait and see whether you intend to fulfill your agreements.”  The root of the trouble—­an evil often felt and still experienced in the United States—­was defective sovereignty, an inability of the whole to control the behavior of its parts.  Jay could not deny that the peace treaty had been violated by state legislation, and only by the humiliating means of an avowal of its impotence could he exonerate the national government from the imputation of bad faith.  The matter was disposed of by provision for a joint commission to decide upon all cases in which it was alleged that unlawful impediments had been placed in the way of collection of debts due British subjects, and by the United States undertaking payment of the awards.  A similar commission was to pass upon American claims for British violation of neutral rights.  This arrangement was a concession whose practical value was eventually shown by the fact that as a result American merchants received some millions of dollars.