According to Jefferson, the President originally took the same view of the French treaty that he did.  Jefferson relates that on April 18, 1793, Washington spoke of having “never had a doubt of the validity of the French treaty,” and he notes that in the cabinet disputes Washington was inclined to his views.  As the embarrassments of the Administration thickened, the President, it is true, leaned more and more toward Hamilton, but this inclination was due more to necessity than to personal partiality.  The explanation stands out in Jefferson’s own account of events.  Hamilton was clear, positive, and decided as to what to do and how to do it.  Jefferson was active in finding objections but not in finding ways and means of action.  This contrast became sharper as time went on, and, as Washington was in a position where he had to do something, he was forced to rely on Hamilton more and more.  Jefferson held that it would be inexpedient for the general government to assume the duty of fortifying the harbors, and that there was no constitutional authority for establishing a military academy.  On November 28, 1793, there was a prolonged wrangle over these issues at a cabinet meeting, which the President ended by saying that he would recommend the military academy to Congress, and “let them decide for themselves whether the Constitution authorized it or not.”  This was the last of the quarrelsome cabinet sessions recorded by Jefferson.  He vacated the office of Secretary of State, December 31, 1793, and thereafter the ascendancy of Hamilton in the Cabinet was indisputed.

An immediate effect of the change was to give new vigor to efforts at reaching a settlement with Great Britain.  The old troubles over her retention of the western posts still continued, and in addition to them came new difficulties arising from war measures.  On January 30, 1793, Thomas Pinckney, then American minister to Great Britain, wrote that war was about to begin, “and although our claim to a free intercourse is founded in reason and our national right, yet, as we have no armed neutrality the members whereof this people have to fear, they may stop our vessels bound to French ports with provisions.”  What was feared soon happened.  By the French decree of 1793, the French colonies were opened to American trade and West Indian commerce flourished.  This was now afflicted by contraband regulations laid down by Great Britain, under which many American vessels were seized for carrying cargoes to or from French ports.  Although Genet’s activities and the extent to which they were indulged by the United States did not tend to promote friendly relations with Great Britain, yet it does not appear that the British policy was inspired by resentment.  The regulations as defined by instructions issued on June 8, 1793, made liable to detention all vessels carrying “corn, flour, or meal” to French ports, with the proviso that the cargoes might be purchased on behalf of the British government and the ships might then be released with a due allowance for freight, or they might be allowed to dispose of their cargoes in the ports of any country in amity with Great Britain.  Vessels attempting to enter a blockaded port were liable to seizure and condemnation, save that the ships of Denmark and Sweden might be seized only if they should persist in trying to enter after once having been turned back.