News that the French Republic had declared war against Great Britain reached the United States early in April, 1793.  Washington, who was then at Mount Vernon, wrote to Jefferson that “it behooves the Government of this country to use every means in its power to prevent the citizens thereof from embroiling us with either of those Powers, by endeavoring to maintain a strict neutrality,” and he requested that the Secretary should “give the subject mature consideration, that such measures as shall be deemed most likely to effect this desirable purpose may be adopted without delay.”  On arriving at Philadelphia a few days later, Washington was met by a distracted Cabinet.  The great difficulty was the conflict of obligations.  The United States had a treaty of alliance with France; it had a treaty of peace with Great Britain.  The situation had become such that it could not sustain both relations at the same time.  If the United States remained neutral, it would have to deny to France privileges conferred by the treaty which had been negotiated when both countries were at war with Great Britain.  How far was that treaty now binding?  It had been made with “the Most Christian king,” whose head had been cut off.  Did not his engagements fall with his head?  That was the very position taken by the government of the French Republic, which had asserted the right to decide what treaties of the old monarchy should be retained and what rejected.  As an incident of the present case, the question was to be decided whether the ambassador of the French Republic should be received.

Such were the issues that Washington’s Administration had to face, at a time when the whole country was thrilling with enthusiasm in behalf of the French Republic.  Chief Justice Marshall left on record his opinion that this feeling “was almost universal,” and that “a great majority of the American people deemed it criminal to remain unconcerned spectators of a conflict between their ancient enemy and republican France.”

Washington acted with his customary deliberation.  On April 18, 1793, he submitted to the members of his Cabinet thirteen questions.  Jefferson, who held that the French treaty was still operative, noted that the questions reached him in Washington’s own handwriting, “yet it was palpable from the style, their ingenious tissue and suite, that they were not the President’s, that they were raised upon a prepared chain of argument, in short, that the language was Hamilton’s and the doubts his alone.”  In Jefferson’s opinion they were designed to lead “to a declaration of the Executive that our treaty with France is void.”  Jefferson was right as to Hamilton’s authorship.  At a time when Jefferson had no advice to give save that it would be well to consider whether Congress ought not to be summoned, Hamilton had ready a set of interrogatories which subjected the whole situation to close analysis.  The critical questions were these: 

“Shall a proclamation issue for the purpose of preventing interferences of the citizens of the United States in the war between France and Great Britain, &c.?  Shall it contain a declaration of neutrality or not?  What shall it contain?