suggested that since the resolution of Congress had directed the Secretary to make a report, it was left to his discretion to “make it in the manner for which he is prepared.”  Gerry adroitly countered by saying that the resolution provided for a report.  That done, it would be time enough “to give him the right to lay before them his explanations, if he thinks explanations necessary.”  The debate was brief and one-sided; the motion for receiving the report in writing was adopted without a division.  Five days later the written report was laid before the House, but the Secretary was never accorded an opportunity to offer any personal explanations.

This masterly report, which is justly regarded as the corner-stone of American public credit, excites the admiration of the reader by the clearness of its analysis, the cogency of its argument, and the broad range of its vision.  The principles of action that it embodied, however, were few and simple, chief among them being exact and punctual fulfillment of contract.  “States, like individuals, who observe their engagements, are respected and trusted; while the reverse is the fate of those who pursue an opposite conduct.”  To discharge the principal of the public debt was of course impracticable; nor was it desirable, as the creditors would be well pleased to leave it at interest.  Incidentally the funding of the debt would provide securities that would serve trade as a species of currency, and would set in motion a long train of benefits that would extend throughout the community.  In the funding operation the debts contracted by the States should be included.  As to this Hamilton remarked:  “The general principle of it seems to be equitable, for it seems difficult to conceive a good reason why the expenses for the particular defense of a part in a common war should not be a common charge, as well as those incurred professedly for the general defense.  The defense of each part is that of the whole; and unless the expenditures are brought into a common mass, the tendency must be to add to the calamities suffered by being the most exposed to the ravages of war and increase of burthens.”

Hamilton computed the amount of the foreign debt, principal and arrears, at $11,710,378.62; the domestic debt, including that of the States, at $42,414,085.94,—­a total of over fifty-four millions with an annual interest charge at existing rates amounting to $4,587,444.81,—­a staggering total for a nation whose revenue was then insufficient to meet its current expenses.  Nevertheless Hamilton refused to admit that “such a provision would exceed the abilities of the country,” but he was “clearly of the opinion that to make it would require the extension of taxation to a degree and to objects which the true interest of the public creditor forbids.”  He therefore favored a composition, in arranging which there would be strict adherence to the principle “that no change in the rights of creditors ought to be attempted without