“It seems to me that it is only right, in the first instance, to make an effort to return to Hellas and to revisit our hearths and homes, if only to prove to other Hellenes that it is their own faults if they are poor and needy[6], seeing it is in their power to give to those 26 now living a pauper life at home a free passage hither, and convert them into well-to-do burghers at once.  Now, sirs, is it not clear that all these good things belong to whoever has strength to hold them?

[6] Here seems to be the germ—­unless, indeed, the thought had been
    conceived above—­here at any rate the first conscious expression
    of the colonisation scheme, of which we shall hear more below, in
    reference to Cotyora; the Phasis; Calpe.  It appears again fifty
    years later in the author’s pamphlet “On Revenues,” chapters i.
    and vi.  For the special evils of the fourth century B.C., and the
    growth of pauperism between B.C. 401 and 338, see Jebb, “Attic
    Orators,” vol i. p. 17.

“Let us look another matter in the face.  How are we to march most safely? or where blows are needed, how are we to fight to the best advantage?  That is the question.

“The first thing which I recommend is to burn the wagons we have got, so that we may be free to march wherever the army needs, and not, practically, make our baggage train our general.  And, next, we should throw our tents into the bonfire also:  for these again are only a trouble to carry, and do not contribute one grain of good either for fighting or getting provisions.  Further, let us get rid of all superfluous baggage, save only what we require for the sake of war, or meat and drink, so that as many of us as possible may be under arms, and as few as possible doing porterage.  I need not remind you that, in case of defeat, the owners’ goods are not their own; but if we master our foes, we will make them our baggage bearers.

“It only rests for me to name the one thing which I look upon as the greatest of all.  You see, the enemy did not dare to bring war to bear upon us until they had first seized our generals; they felt that whilst our rulers were there, and we obeyed them, they were no match for us in war; but having got hold of them, they fully expected that the consequent confusion and anarchy would prove fatal to us.  What follows?  This:  Officers and leaders ought to be more vigilant ever than their predecessors; subordinates still more orderly and obedient to those in command now than even they were to those who are gone.  And you should pass a resolution that, in case of insubordination, any one 31 who stands by is to aid the officer in chastising the offender.  So the enemy will be mightily deceived; for on this day they will behold ten thousand Clearchuses instead of one, who will not suffer one man to play the coward.  And now it is high time I brought my remarks to an end, for may be the enemy will be here anon.  Let those who are in favour of these proposals confirm them with all speed, that they may be realised in fact; or if any other course seem better, let not any one, even though he be a private soldier, shrink from proposing it.  Our common safety is our common need.”