6.  We have seen, among the citations in a former chapter, that Sanctius says, “Names are the signs, and as it were the instruments, of things.”  But what he meant by “instrumenta rerum” is not very apparent.  Dr. Adam says, “The principles of grammar may be traced from the progress of the mind in the acquisition of language.  Children first express their feelings by motions and gestures of the body, by cries and tears. This is[31] the language of nature, and therefore universal. It fitly represents[32] the quickness of sentiment and thought, which are as instantaneous as the impression of light on the eye.  Hence we always express our stronger feelings by these natural signs.  But when we want to make known to others the particular conceptions of the mind, we must represent them by parts, we must divide and analyze them.  We express each part by certain signs,[33] and join these together, according to the order of their relations.  Thus words are both the instrument and signs[34] the division of thought.”—­Preface to Latin Gram.

7.  The utterance of words, or the making of signs of any sort, requires time;[35] but it is here suggested by Dr. Adam, that sentiment and thought, though susceptible of being retained or recalled, naturally flash upon the mind with immeasurable quickness.[36] If so, they must originate in something more spiritual than language.  The Doctor does not affirm that words are the instruments of thought, but of the division of thought.  But it is manifest, that if they effect this, they are not the only instruments by means of which the same thing may be done.  The deaf and dumb, though uninstructed and utterly ignorant of language, can think; and can, by rude signs of their own inventing, manifest a similar division, corresponding to the individuality of things.  And what else can be meant by “the division of thought,” than our notion of objects, as existing severally, or as being distinguishable into parts?  There can, I think, be no such division respecting that which is perfectly pure and indivisible in its essence; and, I would ask, is not simple continuity apt to exclude it from our conception of every thing which appears with uniform coherence?  Dr. Beattie says, “It appears to me, that, as all things are individuals, all thoughts must be so too.”—­Moral Science, Chap, i, Sec. 1.  If, then, our thoughts are thus divided, and consequently, as this author infers, have not in themselves any of that generality which belongs to the signification of common nouns, there is little need of any instrument to divide them further:  the mind rather needs help, as Cardell suggests, “to combine its ideas.” [37]