OBS. 3.—­According to the doctrine of Harris, all words denoting the attributes of things, are either verbs, or participles, or adjectives.  Some attributes have their essence in motion:  as, to walk, to run, to fly, to strike, to live; or, walking, running, flying, striking, living.  Others have it in the privation of motion:  as, to stop, to rest, to cease, to die; or, stopping, resting, ceasing, dying.  And there are others which have nothing to do with either motion or its privation; but have their essence in the quantity, quality, or situation of things; as, great and small, white and black, wise and foolish, eastern and western.  These last terms are adjectives; and those which denote motion or its privation, are either verbs or participles, according to their formal meaning; that is, according to their manner of attribution.  See Hermes, p. 95.  Verbs commonly say or affirm something of their subjects; as, “The babe wept.”  Participles suggest the action or attribute without affirmation; as, “A babe weeping,”—­“An act regretted.”

OBS. 4.—­A verb, then, being expressive of some attribute, which it ascribes to the thing or person named as its subject; of time, which it divides and specifies by the tenses; and also, (with the exception of the infinitive,) of an assertion or affirmation; if we take away the affirmation and the distinction of tenses, there will remain the attribute and the general notion of time; and these form the essence of an English participle.  So that a participle is something less than a verb, though derived immediately from it; and something more than an adjective, or mere attribute, though its manner of attribution is commonly the same.  Hence, though the participle by rejecting the idea of time may pass almost insensibly into an adjective, and become truly a participial adjective; yet the participle and the adjective are by no means one and the same part of speech, as some will have them to be.  There is always an essential difference in their meaning.  For instance:  there is a difference between a thinking man and a man thinking; between a bragging fellow and a fellow bragging; between a fast-sailing ship and a ship sailing fast.  A thinking man, a bragging fellow, or a fast-sailing ship, is contemplated as being habitually or permanently such; a man thinking, a fellow bragging, or a ship sailing fast, is contemplated as performing a particular act; and this must embrace a period of time, whether that time be specified or not.  John Locke was a thinking man; but we should directly contradict his own doctrine, to suppose him always thinking.