but that which, in the actual state of the things included, “is not exceeded.”  Again, as soon as any given comparative or superlative is, by a further elevation or intension of the quality, surpassed and exceeded, that particular degree, whatever it was, becomes merely positive; for the positive degree of a quality, though it commonly includes the very lowest measure, and is understood to exceed nothing, may at any time equal the very highest.  There is no paradox in all this, which is not also in the following simple examples:  “Easier, indeed, I was, but far from easy.”—­Cowper’s Life, p. 50.

   “Who canst the wisest wiser make,
    And babes as wise as they.”—­Cowper’s Poems.

OBS. 7.—­The relative nature of these degrees deserves to be further illustrated. (1.) It is plain, that the greatest degree of a quality in one thing, may be less than the least in an other; and, consequently, that the least degree in one thing, may be greater than the greatest in an other.  Thus, the heaviest wood is less heavy than the lightest of the metals; and the least valuable of the metals is perhaps of more value than the choicest wood. (2.) The comparative degree may increase upon itself, and be repeated to show the gradation.  Thus, a man may ascend into the air with a balloon, and rise higher, and higher, and higher, and higher, till he is out of sight.  This is no uncommon form of expression, and the intension is from comparative to comparative. (3.) If a ladder be set up for use, one of its rounds will be the highest, and one other will be the lowest, or least high. And as that which is highest, is higher than all the rest, so every one will be higher than all below it. The higher rounds, if spoken of generally, and without definite contrast, will be those in the upper half; the lower rounds, referred to in like manner, will be those in the lower half, or those not far from the ground. The highest rounds, or the lowest, if we indulge such latitude of speech, will be those near the top or the bottom; there being, absolutely, or in strictness of language, but one of each. (4.) If the highest round be removed, or left uncounted, the next becomes the highest, though not so high as the former.  For every one is the highest of the number which it completes.  All admit this, till we come to three.  And, as the third is the highest of the three, I see not why the second is not properly the highest of the two.  Yet nearly all our grammarians condemn this phrase, and prefer “the higher of the two.”  But can they give a reason for their preference?  That the comparative degree is implied between the positive and the superlative, so that there must needs be three terms before the