things liable to be misjoined.  It is proper, therefore, for every grammarian gravely to consider, whether and how far the principles of his philosophy, his politics, his morals, or his religion, ought to influence, or actually do influence, his theory of language, and his practical instructions respecting the right use of words.  In practice, grammar is so interwoven with all else that is known, believed, learned, or spoken of among men, that to determine its own peculiar principles with due distinctness, seems to be one of the most difficult points of a grammarian’s duty.

2.  From misapprehension, narrowness of conception, or improper bias, in relation to this point, many authors have started wrong; denounced others with intemperate zeal; departed themselves from sound doctrine; and produced books which are disgraced not merely by occasional oversights, but by central and radical errors.  Hence, too, have sprung up, in the name of grammar, many unprofitable discussions, and whimsical systems of teaching, calculated rather to embarrass than to inform the student.  Mere collisions of opinion, conducted without any acknowledged standard to guide the judgement, never tend to real improvement.  Grammar is unquestionably a branch of that universal philosophy by which the thoroughly educated mind is enlightened to see all things aright; for philosophy, in this sense of the term, is found in everything.  Yet, properly speaking, the true grammarian is not a philosopher, nor can any man strengthen his title to the former character by claiming the latter; and it is certain, that a most disheartening proportion of what in our language has been published under the name of Philosophic Grammar, is equally remote from philosophy, from grammar, and from common sense.

3.  True grammar is founded on the authority of reputable custom; and that custom, on the use which men make of their reason.  The proofs of what is right are accumulative, and on many points there can be no dispute, because our proofs from the best usage, are both obvious and innumerable.  On the other hand, the evidence of what is wrong is rather demonstrative; for when we would expose a particular error, we exhibit it in contrast with the established principle which it violates.  He who formed the erroneous sentence, has in this case no alternative, but either to acknowledge the solecism, or to deny the authority of the rule.  There are disputable principles in grammar, as there are moot points in law; but this circumstance affects no settled usage in either; and every person of sense and taste will choose to express himself in the way least liable to censure.  All are free indeed from positive constraint on their phraseology; for we do not speak or write by statutes.  But the ground of instruction assumed in grammar, is similar to that upon which are established the maxims of common law, in jurisprudence.  The ultimate principle, then, to which we appeal, as the only true standard of grammatical propriety, is that species of custom which critics denominate GOOD USE; that is, present, reputable, general use.