22.  Julius Caesar Scaliger, from whose opinion Sanctius dissents above, seems to limit the science of grammar to bounds considerably too narrow, though he found within them room for the exercise of much ingenuity and learning.  He says, “Grammatica est scientia loquendi ex usu; neque enim constituit regulas scientibus usus modum, sed ex eorum statis frequentibusque usurpatiombus colligit communem rationem loquendi, quam discentibus traderet.”—­De Causis L. Latinae, Lib. iv, Cap. 76.  “Grammar is the science of speaking according to use; for it does not establish rules for those who know the manner of use, but from the settled and frequent usages of these, gathers the common fashion of speaking, which it should deliver to learners.”  This limited view seems not only to exclude from the science the use of the pen, but to exempt the learned from any obligation to respect the rules prescribed for the initiation of the young.  But I have said, and with abundant authority, that the acquisition of a good style of writing is the main purpose of the study; and, surely, the proficients and adepts in the art can desire for themselves no such exemption.  Men of genius, indeed, sometimes affect to despise the pettiness of all grammatical instructions; but this can be nothing else than affectation, since the usage of the learned is confessedly the basis of all such instructions, and several of the loftiest of their own rank appear on the list of grammarians.

23.  Quintilian, whose authority is appealed to above, belonged to that age in which the exegesis of histories, poems, and other writings, was considered an essential part of grammar.  He therefore, as well as Diomedes, and other ancient writers, divided the grammarian’s duties into two parts; the one including what is now called grammar, and the other the explanation of authors, and the stigmatizing of the unworthy.  Of the opinion referred to by Sanctius, it seems proper to make here an ampler citation.  It shall be attempted in English, though the paragraph is not an easy one to translate.  I understand the author to say, “Speakers, too, have their rules to observe; and writers, theirs.  Language is established by reason, antiquity, authority, and custom.  Of reason the chief ground is analogy, but sometimes etymology.  Ancient things have a certain majesty, and, as I might say, religion, to commend them.  Authority is wont to be sought from orators and historians; the necessity of metre mostly excuses the poets.  When the judgement of the chief masters of eloquence passes for reason, even error seems right to those who follow great leaders.  But, of the art of speaking, custom is the surest mistress; for speech is evidently to be used as money, which has upon it a public stamp.  Yet all these things require a penetrating judgement, especially analogy; the force of which is, that one may refer what is doubtful, to something similar that is clearly established, and thus prove uncertain things by those which are sure.”—­QUINT, de Inst.  Orat., Lib. i, Cap. 6, p. 48.