OBS. 3.—According to S. Kirkham’s notion, “LANGUAGE, in its most extensive sense, implies those signs by which men and brutes, communicate to each other their thoughts, affections and desires.”—Kirkham’s English Gram., p. 16. Again: “The language of brutes consists in the use of those inarticulate sounds by which they express their thoughts and affections.”—Ib. To me it seems a shameful abuse of speech, and a vile descent from the dignity of grammar, to make the voices of “brutes” any part of language, as taken in a literal sense. We might with far more propriety raise our conceptions of it to the spheres above, and construe literally the metaphors of David, who ascribes to the starry heavens, both “speech” and “language,” “voice” and “words,” daily “uttered” and everywhere “heard.” See Psalm xix.
OBS. 4.—But, strange as it may seem, Kirkham, commencing his instructions with the foregoing definition of language, proceeds to divide it, agreeably to this notion, into two sorts, natural and artificial; and affirms that the former “is common both to man and brute,” and that the language which is peculiar to man, the language which consists of words, is altogether an artificial invention:[83] thereby contradicting at once a host of the most celebrated grammarians and philosophers, and that without appearing to know it. But this is the less strange, since he immediately forgets his own definition and division of the subject, and as plainly contradicts himself.