of praise or reward.  Without alluding here to my own books, no one being obliged to accuse himself, I doubt whether we have any school grammar that is much less objectionable in this respect, than Murray’s; and yet I am greatly mistaken, if nine tenths of all the definitions in Murray’s system are not faulty.  “It was this sort of definitions, which made Scaliger say, ’Nihil infelicius definitore grammatico.’”—­See Johnson’s Gram.  Com., p. 351; also Paragraph 5th, above.

17.  Nor can this objection be neutralized by saying, it is a mere matter of opinion—­a mere prejudice originating in rivalry.  For, though we have ample choice of terms, and may frequently assign to particular words a meaning and an explanation which are in some degree arbitrary; yet whenever we attempt to define things under the name which custom has positively fixed upon them, we are no longer left to arbitrary explications; but are bound to think and to say that only which shall commend itself to the understanding of others, as being altogether true to nature.  When a word is well understood to denote a particular object or class of objects, the definition of it ought to be in strict conformity to what is known of the real being and properties of the thing or things contemplated.  A definition of this kind is a proposition susceptible of proof and illustration; and therefore whatsoever is erroneously assumed to be the proper meaning of such a term, may be refuted.  But those persons who take every thing upon trust, and choose both to learn and to teach mechanically, often become so slavishly habituated to the peculiar phraseology of their text-books, that, be the absurdity of a particular expression what it may, they can neither discover nor suspect any inaccuracy in it.  It is also very natural even for minds more independent and acute, to regard with some reverence whatsoever was gravely impressed upon them in childhood.  Hence the necessity that all school-books should proceed from skillful hands.  Instruction should tell things as they are, and never falter through negligence.

18.  I have admitted that definitions are not the only means by which a general knowledge of the import of language may be acquired; nor are they the only means by which the acquisition of such knowledge may be aided.  To exhibit or point out things and tell their names, constitutes a large part of that instruction by which the meaning of words is conveyed to the young mind; and, in many cases, a mere change or apposition of terms may sufficiently explain our idea.  But when we would guard against the possibility of misapprehension, and show precisely what is meant by a word, we must fairly define it.  There are, however, in every language, many words which do not admit of a formal definition.  The import of all definitive and connecting particles must be learned from usage, translation, or derivation; and nature reserves to herself the power of explaining the objects