could he fight in Italy and in Cilicia, Egypt and Syria, Greece and Spain, in the Ionian Sea and the islands?  Consequently you need many soldiers and generals both, to take matters in hand, if they are going to be of any use to you. [-36-] In case any one declares that even if you confide the entire war to some one person he will most certainly have plenty of admirals and lieutenants, my reply would be:  ’Would it not be much juster and more advantageous for these men destined to serve under him to be chosen by you beforehand for the very purpose and to receive an independent command from you?  What prevents such a course?’ By this plan they will pay more heed to the war, since each of them is entrusted with his own particular share and cannot lay upon any one else the responsibility for neglect of it, and there will be keener rivalry among them because they are independent and will themselves get the glory for whatever they effect.  By the other plan what man do you think, subordinate to some one else, will with equal readiness perform any duty, when the credit for his victory will belong not to himself but to another?

“Accordingly, that one man could not at one time carry on so great a war has been admitted on the part of Gabinius himself, in that he asks for many helpers to be given to whomever is elected.  Our final consideration is whether actual commanders or assistants should be sent, and whether they should be despatched by the entire populace, or by the commandant alone for his assistance.  Every one of you would agree that my proposition is more law-abiding in all respects, and not merely in reference to the case of the freebooters.  Aside from that, notice how it looks for all our offices to be overthrown on the pretext of ‘pirates’ and for no one of them either in Italy or in subject territory during this time ...” [8]

[-37-] ... and of Italy in place of consul for three years, they assigned to him fifteen lieutenants and voted all the ships, money and armaments that he might wish to take.  These measures as well as the others which the senate decided to be necessary to their effectiveness in any given case that body ratified even against its will.  Its action was prompted more particularly by the fact that when Piso refused to allow the subordinate officers to hold enlistments in Gallia Narbonensis, of which he was governor, the populace was furiously enraged and would straightway have cast him out of office, had not Pompey begged him off.  So after making preparations as the business and his judgment demanded he patrolled at one time the whole stretch of sea that the pirates were troubling, partly himself and partly through the agency of his under officers, and subdued the greater part of it that very year.  For whereas the force that he directed was vast both in point of fleet and in point of heavy-armed infantry, so that he was irresistible both on sea and on land, his kindness to those who made terms with him was