[-31-] “That I have been exceedingly zealous, Quirites, in behalf of your body, all of you, doubtless, clearly understand. This being so, it is requisite for me to set forth in simple fashion and quite frankly what I know to be for the good of the State; and it is only fair for you to listen to it calmly and afterward to deliberate. For, if you raise an uproar, you will fail of obtaining some perhaps very useful suggestion which you might have heard, but if you pay attention to what is said you will be sure to discover definitely something to your advantage. I for my part assert in the first place most emphatically that it is not proper to confide to any one man so many positions of command, one after another. This has been forbidden by law, and by test has been found to be most perilous. What made Marius such a monster was practically nothing else than being entrusted with so many wars in the briefest space of time and being made consul six times as rapidly as possible: and similarly the cause of Sulla’s frenzy was that he held command of the armies so many years in succession, and later was appointed dictator, then consul. It does not lie in man’s nature for a person, not necessarily young but mature quite as often, after exercise in authority for a considerable period to be willing to abide by ancestral customs.[-32-] I do not say this in any spirit of condemnation of Pompey, but because it does not appear at all advantageous to you on general grounds, and further it is not permitted according to the laws. For if an enterprise brings honor to those deemed worthy of it, all whom that enterprise concerns ought to obtain honor; this is the principle of democracy: and if it brings labor, all ought to share that labor proportionately; this is mere equity.
“Again, in such an affair it is to your advantage for many individuals to have practice in exploits, so that as a result of trial your choice may be an easy one from among those who can be trusted for any urgent business; but if you take that other course it is quite inevitable that the scarcity should be great of those who will practice what they should, and to whom interests can be trusted. This is the chief reason why you were at a loss for a general in the war with Sertorius; previous to that time you were accustomed to employ the same men for a long period. Consequently, even if in all other respects Pompey deserves to be elected against the pirates, still, inasmuch as he would be chosen contrary to the injunction of the laws and to the principles laid down by experience, it behooves both you and him most strongly that it be not done.