and suggesting that, treaty or no treaty, frontier
or no frontier, Russia would be out to slay Teutons
or England to steal colonies. Here, as elsewhere,
I think the professors dotted all over the Baltic
plain fail in lucidity, and in the power of distinguishing
ideas. Of course it is quite true that England
has material interests to defend, and will probably
use the opportunity to defend them: or, in other
words, of course England, like everybody else, would
be more comfortable if Prussia were less predominant.
The fact remains that we did not do what the Germans
did. We did not invade Holland to seize a naval
and commercial advantage: and whether they say
that we wished to do it in our greed, or feared to
do it in our cowardice, the fact remains that we did
not do it. Unless this common-sense principle
be kept in view, I cannot conceive how any quarrel
can possibly be judged. A contract may be made
between two persons solely for material advantage
on each side: but the moral advantage is still
generally supposed to lie with the person who keeps
the contract. Surely it cannot be dishonest to
be honest—even if honesty is the best policy.
Imagine the most complex maze of indirect motives;
and still the man who keeps faith for money cannot
possibly be worse than the man who breaks faith for
money. It will be noted that this ultimate test
applies in the same way to Servia as to Belgium and
Britain. The Servians may not be a very peaceful
people; but, on the occasion under discussion, it
was certainly they who wanted peace. You may
choose to think the Serb a sort of born robber:
but on this occasion it was certainly the Austrian
who was trying to rob. Similarly, you may call
England perfidious as a sort of historical summary;
and declare your private belief that Mr. Asquith was
vowed from infancy to the ruin of the German Empire,
a Hannibal and hater of the eagles. But, when
all is said, it is nonsense to call a man perfidious
because he keeps his promise. It is absurd to
complain of the sudden treachery of a business man
in turning up punctually to his appointment: or
the unfair shock given to a creditor by the debtor
paying his debts.
Lastly, there is an attitude not unknown in the crisis
against which I should particularly like to protest.
I should address my protest especially to those lovers
and pursuers of Peace who, very short-sightedly, have
occasionally adopted it. I mean the attitude which
is impatient of these preliminary details about who
did this or that, and whether it was right or wrong.
They are satisfied with saying that an enormous calamity,
called War, has been begun by some or all of us; and
should be ended by some or all of us. To these
people this preliminary chapter about the precise
happenings must appear not only dry (and it must of
necessity be the driest part of the task) but essentially
needless and barren. I wish to tell these people
that they are wrong; that they are wrong upon all principles
of human justice and historic continuity: but
that they are specially and supremely wrong upon their
own principles of arbitration and international peace.