This unlooked-for celerity caused the greatest consternation in the party of Marie, who had anticipated that the conquest of Normandy would have occupied the royal forces during a considerable period, and relying on this contingency, had not yet completed the defences of Angers.  The Queen herself, however, continued to refuse all overtures of reconciliation, and after having vainly demanded a month’s truce, she turned her whole attention to the formation of such an army as might enable her to compete with that by which she saw herself assailed.  Her forces already amounted to fifteen hundred horse and eight thousand infantry, and she was anticipating a strong reinforcement, which was to be supplied by the Duc de Rohan and the Comte de Saint-Aignan.  Her first care was to garrison the town and citadel of Angers, in order to secure her personal safety; but this precaution did not satisfy the Duc de Mayenne, who urged her to retire to Guienne, where he had collected a force of ten thousand men, and thus to place herself beyond all possibility of capture.  The Duc d’Epernon, on the other hand, who was jealous of the influence which such a step must necessarily give to his rival, strongly dissuaded the Queen from condescending to retreat before the royal army; and suggested that M. de Mayenne would more effectually serve her cause and uphold her honour by marching his troops to Angers, and thus strengthening her position.  This suggestion, by whatever motive it were prompted, was one of sound policy; nor can there be any doubt that it would have been readily adopted by Marie de Medicis, had there not been a traitor in the camp, whose covert schemes must have been foiled by such an addition to the faction of his royal mistress.

That traitor was Richelieu, by whom every movement in the rebel army, and every decision of the Queen-mother’s Council, was immediately revealed to De Luynes.  The wily Bishop, faithful to his own interests, and lured onward by the vision of a cardinal’s hat, no sooner saw the impression produced upon the mind of Marie by the proposal of Epernon than he hastened to oppose a measure which threatened all his hopes, and succeeded with some difficulty in persuading her that both these great nobles could more effectually serve her in their own governments than by adding a useless burthen to her dower-city, which was already gorged with troops, and which, in the event of a siege, might suffer more from internal scarcity than external violence.

Bewildered by the uncertainty of the struggle which was about to supervene, Marie de Medicis was readily induced to believe in the wisdom of securing two havens of refuge in case of defeat, and to renounce the peril of hazarding all at one blow.  The arguments of Richelieu were specious; she had the most perfect faith in his attachment and fidelity; and thus, despite the most earnest remonstrances of her other counsellors, she decided upon following the suggestions of the man who was seeking to build up his own fortunes upon the ruin of her hopes.[53]