The main field of discussion touching Compromise in expression and avowal lies in the region of religious belief.  In politics no one seriously contends that respect for the feelings and prejudices of other people requires us to be silent about our opinions.  A republican, for instance, is at perfect liberty to declare himself so.  Nobody will say that he is not within his rights if he should think it worth while to practise this liberty, though of course he will have to face the obloquy which attends all opinion that is not shared by the more demonstrative and vocal portions of the public.  It is true that in every stable society a general conviction prevails of the extreme undesirableness of constantly laying bare the foundations of government.  Incessant discussion of the theoretical bases of the social union is naturally considered worse than idle.  It is felt by many wise men that the chief business of the political thinker is to interest himself in generalisations of such a sort as leads with tolerable straightness to practical improvements of a far-reaching and durable kind.  Even among those, however, who thus feel it not to be worth while to be for ever handling the abstract principles which are, after all, only clumsy expressions of the real conditions that bring and keep men together in society, yet nobody of any consideration pretends to silence or limit the free discussion of these principles.  Although a man is not likely to be thanked who calls attention to the vast discrepancies between the theory and practice of the constitution, yet nobody now would countenance the notion of an inner doctrine in politics.  We smile at the line that Hume took in speaking of the doctrine of non-resistance.  He did not deny that the right of resistance to a tyrannical sovereign does actually belong to a nation.  But, he said, ’if ever on any occasion it were laudable to conceal truth from the populace, it must be confessed that the doctrine of resistance affords such an example; and that all speculative reasoners ought to observe with regard to this principle the same cautious silence which the laws, in every species of government, have ever prescribed to themselves.’  As if the cautious silence of the political writer could prevent a populace from feeling the heaviness of an oppressor’s hand, and striving to find relief from unjust burdens.  As if any nation endowed with enough of the spirit of independence to assent to the right of resistance when offered to them as a speculative theorem, would not infallibly be led by the same spirit to assert the right without the speculative theorem.  That so acute a head as Hume’s should have failed to perceive these very plain considerations, and that he should moreover have perpetrated the absurdity of declaring the right of resistance, in the same breath in which he declares the laudableness of keeping it a secret, only allows how carefully a man need steer after he has once involved himself in the labyrinths of Economy.[18]