time.  Mr. Mill limits the province of the civil magistrate to the repression of acts that directly and immediately injure others than the doer of them.  So long as acts, including the expression of opinions, are purely self-regarding, it seems to him expedient in the long run that they should not be interfered with by the magistrate.  He goes much further than this.  Self-regarding acts should not be interfered with by the magistrate.  Not only self-regarding acts, but all opinions whatever, should, moreover, be as little interfered with as possible by public opinion, except in the way of vigorous argumentation and earnest persuasion in a contrary direction; the silent but most impressive solicitation of virtuous example; the wise and careful upbringing of the young, so that when they enter life they may be most nobly fitted to choose the right opinions and obey the right motives.

The consideration by which he supports this rigorous confinement of external interference on the part of government, or the unorganised members of the community whose opinion is called public opinion, to cases of self-protection, are these, some of which have been already stated:—­

1.  By interfering to suppress opinions or experiments in living, you may resist truths and improvements in a greater or less degree.

2.  Constant discussion is the only certain means of preserving the freshness of truth in men’s minds, and the vitality of its influence upon their conduct and motives.

3.  Individuality is one of the most valuable elements of wellbeing, and you can only be sure of making the most of individuality, if you have an atmosphere of freedom, encouraging free development and expansion.

4.  Habitual resort to repressive means of influencing conduct tends more than anything else to discredit and frustrate the better means, such as education, good example, and the like. (Liberty, 148.)

The principle which he deduces from these considerations is—­’that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection; the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, is to prevent harm to others.  His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.  He cannot be rightfully compelled to do or forbear because it will make him happier, because in the opinion of others to do so would be wise or even right.  These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise.  To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to others.’ (Liberty, 22.)