after the class of property-holders had allowed the Revolution of February to take place, and to sweep away that dynasty in which their principles stood incarnate.  The French imperial throne is in an especial manner the result of that alarm.  When General Cavaignac had succeeded in conquering the “Reds,” a military dictatorship followed his victory as a matter of course, and it remained with him to settle the future of France.  The principles of his family led him to sympathize with the “oppressed nationalities” which were then struggling in so many places for freedom; and had he interfered decidedly in behalf of the Italians and Hungarians, he would have changed the fate of Europe.  He would have become the hero of the great political movement which his country had inaugurated, and his sword would have outweighed the batons of Radetzky and Paskevitsch.  Both principle and selfishness pointed to such intervention, and there can be no doubt that the Republican Dictator seriously thought of it.  But the peculiarities of his position forbade his following the path that was pointed out to him.  As the champion of property, as the chief of the coalesced parties which had triumphed over “the enemies of property” in the streets and lanes of “the capital of civilization,” he was required to concentrate his energies on domestic matters.  Yet further:  all men in other countries who were contending with governments were looked upon by the property party in France as the enemies of order, as Agrarians, who were seeking the destruction of society, and therefore were not worthy of either the assistance or the sympathy of France; so that the son of the old Conventionist of ’93 was forced, by the views of the men of whom he so strangely found himself the chief, to become in effect the ally of the Austrian Kaiser and the Russian Czar.  The Italians, who were seeking only to get rid of “barbarian” rule, and the Hungarians, who were contending for the preservation of a polity as old as the English Constitution against the destructives of the imperial court, were held up to the world as men desirous in their zeal for revolution to overturn all existing institutions!  Aristocrats with pedigrees that shamed those of the Bourbon and the Romanoff were spoken of in language that might possibly have been applicable to the lazzaroni of Naples, that lazzaroni being on the side of the “law and order” classes.  As General Cavaignac did nothing to win the affections of the French people, as he was the mere agent of men rendered fierce by fear, it cannot be regarded as strange, that, when the Presidential election took place, he found himself nowhere in the race with Louis Napoleon.  He was deserted even by a large portion of the men whose work he had done so well, but who saw in the new candidate for their favor one who could become a more powerful protector of property than the African general,—­one who had a name of weight, not merely with the army, but with that multitudinous peasant class from which