I know no better illustration to prove the justice of this view of the Premier’s political failing than his bearing in the debate which I am attempting to describe.  Here was a grave constitutional question.  The issue was a simple and clear one.  Had the Lords the right to reject a Money Bill which had passed the House?  If historical precedents settled the question clearly, then there was no difficulty in determining the matter at once, and almost without discussion.  If, however, there were no precedents bearing precisely on this case, then it was all the more important that this should be made the occasion of a settlement of the question so unequivocal and positive as effectually to guard against future complication and embarrassment.  Now how did the Premier deal with this issue?  He disregarded the homely wisdom contained in the pithy bull of Sir Boyle Roche, that “the best way to avoid a dilemma is to meet it plump.”  He dodged the dilemma.  His resolutions, worded with ingenious obscurity, skilfully evaded the important aspect of the controversy, and two of them, the second and third, gave equal consolation to the Liberals and the Conservatives.  So that, in fact, it is reserved for some future Parliament, in which it cannot be doubted that the Radical element will be more numerous and more powerful, to determine what should have been decided on this very evening.  It was cleverly done, certainly, and extorted from all parties and members of every shade of political opinion that admiration which the successful performance of a difficult and critical task must always elicit.  But was it statesmanlike, or in any high sense patriotic or manly?

The Premier was followed by R.P.  Collier, representing Plymouth.  He had been on the committee to search for precedents, and he devoted an hour to showing that there was not, in all Parliamentary history, a single precedent justifying the action of the Lords.  His argument was clear and convincing, and the result of it was, that no bill simply imposing or remitting a tax had ever in a single instance been rejected by the Upper House.  In all the thirty-six cases relied on by the Opposition there was always some other principle involved, which furnished plausible justification for the course adopted by the Lords.

To this speech I observed that Mr. Gladstone paid strict attention, occasionally indicating his assent by an approving nod, or by an encouraging “Hear!  Hear!” It is rare, indeed, that any speaker in the House secures the marked attention or catches the eye of the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

To Collier succeeded Coningham, member for Brighton.  Now as this honorable member was prosy and commonplace, not to say stupid, I should not detain my readers with any allusion to his speech, but as illustrating a prominent and very creditable feature of the debates in the House.  That time is of some value, and that no remarks can be tolerated, unless they are intelligent and pertinent, are cardinal doctrines