they are plainly meant to strike the popular judgment.  Whistler’s pictures seem often meant to escape the popular judgment; they even seem meant to escape the popular admiration.  They are elusive, fugitive; they fly even from praise.  Doubtless many artists in Michelangelo’s day declared themselves to be great artists, although they were unsuccessful.  But they did not declare themselves great artists because they were unsuccessful:  that is the peculiarity of our own time, which has a positive bias against the populace.

Another case of the same kind of thing can be found in the latest conceptions of humour.  By the wholesome tradition of mankind, a joke was a thing meant to amuse men; a joke which did not amuse them was a failure, just as a fire which did not warm them was a failure.  But we have seen the process of secrecy and aristocracy introduced even into jokes.  If a joke falls flat, a small school of aesthetes only ask us to notice the wild grace of its falling and its perfect flatness after its fall.  The old idea that the joke was not good enough for the company has been superseded by the new aristocratic idea that the company was not worthy of the joke.  They have introduced an almost insane individualism into that one form of intercourse which is specially and uproariously communal.  They have made even levities into secrets.  They have made laughter lonelier than tears.

There is a third thing to which the mystagogues have recently been applying the methods of a secret society:  I mean manners.  Men who sought to rebuke rudeness used to represent manners as reasonable and ordinary; now they seek to represent them as private and peculiar.  Instead of saying to a man who blocks up a street or the fireplace, “You ought to know better than that,” the moderns say, “You, of course, don’t know better than that.”

I have just been reading an amusing book by Lady Grove called “The Social Fetich,” which is a positive riot of this new specialism and mystification.  It is due to Lady Grove to say that she has some of the freer and more honourable qualities of the old Whig aristocracy, as well as their wonderful worldliness and their strange faith in the passing fashion of our politics.  For instance, she speaks of Jingo Imperialism with a healthy English contempt; and she perceives stray and striking truths, and records them justly—­as, for instance, the greater democracy of the Southern and Catholic countries of Europe.  But in her dealings with social formulae here in England she is, it must frankly be said, a common mystagogue.  She does not, like a decent demagogue, wish to make people understand; she wishes to make them painfully conscious of not understanding.  Her favourite method is to terrify people from doing things that are quite harmless by telling them that if they do they are the kind of people who would do other things, equally harmless.  If you ask after somebody’s mother (or whatever it is), you are the kind of person who would have a pillow-case, or would not have a pillow-case.  I forget which it is; and so, I dare say, does she.  If you assume the ordinary dignity of a decent citizen and say that you don’t see the harm of having a mother or a pillow-case, she would say that of course you wouldn’t.  This is what I call being a mystagogue.  It is more vulgar than being a demagogue; because it is much easier.