religion and philosophy an absurd assumption that a
man is in some way just and well-poised because he
has come to no conclusion; and that a man is in some
way knocked off the list of fair judges because he
has come to a conclusion. It is assumed that
the sceptic has no bias; whereas he has a very obvious
bias in favour of scepticism. I remember once
arguing with an honest young atheist, who was very
much shocked at my disputing some of the assumptions
which were absolute sanctities to him (such as the
quite unproved proposition of the independence of
matter and the quite improbable proposition of its
power to originate mind), and he at length fell back
upon this question, which he delivered with an honourable
heat of defiance and indignation: “Well,
can you tell me any man of intellect, great in science
or philosophy, who accepted the miraculous?”
I said, “With pleasure. Descartes, Dr. Johnson,
Newton, Faraday, Newman, Gladstone, Pasteur, Browning,
Brunetiere—as many more as you please.”
To which that quite admirable and idealistic young
man made this astonishing reply—“Oh,
but of course they
had to say that; they were
Christians.” First he challenged me to find
a black swan, and then he ruled out all my swans because
they were black. The fact that all these great
intellects had come to the Christian view was somehow
or other a proof either that they were not great intellects
or that they had not really come to that view.
The argument thus stood in a charmingly convenient
form: “All men that count have come to my
conclusion; for if they come to your conclusion they
do not count.”
It did not seem to occur to such controversialists
that if Cardinal Newman was really a man of intellect,
the fact that he adhered to dogmatic religion proved
exactly as much as the fact that Professor Huxley,
another man of intellect, found that he could not adhere
to dogmatic religion; that is to say (as I cheerfully
admit), it proved precious little either way.
If there is one class of men whom history has proved
especially and supremely capable of going quite wrong
in all directions, it is the class of highly intellectual
men. I would always prefer to go by the bulk
of humanity; that is why I am a democrat. But
whatever be the truth about exceptional intelligence
and the masses, it is manifestly most unreasonable
that intelligent men should be divided upon the absurd
modern principle of regarding every clever man who
cannot make up his mind as an impartial judge, and
regarding every clever man who can make up his mind
as a servile fanatic. As it is, we seem to regard
it as a positive objection to a reasoner that he has
taken one side or the other. We regard it (in
other words) as a positive objection to a reasoner
that he has contrived to reach the object of his reasoning.
We call a man a bigot or a slave of dogma because he
is a thinker who has thought thoroughly and to a definite
end. We say that the juryman is not a juryman
because he has brought in a verdict. We say that
the judge is not a judge because he gives judgment.
We say that the sincere believer has no right to vote,
simply because he has voted.