whomsoever further than may be necessary for their protection under the laws of this state”; and bequeathing also to Dangerfield all his other property in trust for the use of these negroes and their descendants forever.  These provisions were being duly followed when on a December morning in 1837 Rebecca Rhame, the remarried widow of Broad’s late brother-in-law, descended upon the Broad plantation in a buggy with John J. Singletary whom she had employed for the occasion under power of attorney.  Finding no white person at the residence, Singletary ordered the negroes into the yard and told them they were seized in Mrs. Rhame’s behalf and must go with him to Charleston.  At this juncture Dangerfield, the trustee, came up and demanded Singletary’s authority, whereupon the latter showed him his power of attorney and read him the laws under which he was proceeding.  Dangerfield, seeking delay, said it would be a pity to drag the negroes through the mud, and sent a boy to bring his own wagon for them.  While this vehicle was being awaited Colonel James Ferguson, a dignitary of the neighborhood who had evidently been secretly sent for by Dangerfield, galloped up, glanced over the power of attorney, branded the whole affair as a cheat, and told Dangerfield to order Singletary off the premises, driving him away with a whip if necessary, and to shoot if the conspirators should bring reinforcements.  “After giving this advice, which he did apparently under great excitement, Ferguson rode off.”  Singletary then said that for his part he had not come to take or lose life; and he and his employer departed.  Mrs. Rhame then sued Ferguson and Dangerfield to procure possession of the negroes, claiming that she had legally seized them on the occasion described.  At the trial in the circuit court, Singletary rehearsed the seizure and testified further that Dangerfield had left the negroes customarily to themselves in virtually complete freedom.  In rebuttal, Dr. Theodore Gaillard testified that the negroes, whom he described as orderly by habit, were kept under control by the trustee and made to work.  The verdict of the jury, deciding the questions of fact in pursuance of the judge’s charge as to the law, was in favor of the defendants; and Mrs. Rhame entered a motion for a new trial.  This was in due course denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that Broad’s will had clearly vested title to the slaves in Dangerfield, who after Broad’s death was empowered to do with them as he pleased.  If he, who was by the will merely trustee but by law the full owner, had given up the practical dominion over the slaves and left them to their own self-government they were liable to seizure under the law of 1800.  This question of fact, the court concluded, had properly been put to the jury along with the issue as to the effectiveness of the plaintiff’s seizure of the slaves; and the verdict for the defendants was declared conclusive.[25]

[Footnote 25:  Rebecca Rhame vs.  James Ferguson and John R. Dangerfield, in Rice, Law Reports of South Carolina, I, 196-203.]