expended upward of $100,000,000, in efforts to suppress
it; yet the insurrection seems today as active and
as powerful as it has ever been.” Spain’s
losses among her troops were not due so much to the
casualties of war as they were to the ravages of disease,
especially yellow fever. The process, in which
both parties would appear to be about equally culpable,
of destroying property and taking life when occasion
offered, proceedings which are hardly to be dignified
by the name of war, continued until the beginning
of 1878. Throughout the entire period of the war,
the American officials labored diligently for its
termination on a basis that would give fair promise
of an enduring peace. Many questions arose concerning
the arrest of American citizens and the destruction
of property of American ownership. Proposals
to grant the Cubans the rights of belligerents were
dismissed as not properly warranted by the conditions,
and questions arose regarding the supply of arms and
ammunition, from this country, by filibustering expeditions.
References to Cuban affairs appear in many presidential
messages, and the matter was a subject of much discussion
and numerous measures in Congress. Diplomatic
communication was constantly active. In his message
of December 7, 1875, President Grant said: “The
past year has furnished no evidence of an approaching
termination of the ruinous conflict which has been
raging for seven years in the neighboring island of
Cuba. While conscious that the insurrection has
shown a strength and endurance which make it at least
doubtful whether it be in the power of Spain to subdue
it, it seems unquestionable that no such civil organization
exists which may be recognized as an independent government
capable of performing its international obligations
and entitled to be treated as one of the powers of
the earth.” Nor did he then deem the grant
of belligerent rights to the Cubans as either expedient
or properly warranted by the circumstances.
In 1878, Martinez Campos was Governor-General of Cuba,
and Maximo Gomez was Commander-in-Chief of the Cuban
forces. Both parties were weary of the prolonged
hostilities, and neither was able to compel the other
to surrender. Spain, however, professed a willingness
to yield an important part of the demands of her rebellious
subjects. Martinez Campos and Gomez met at Zanjon
and, on February 10, 1878, mutually agreed to what
has been variously called a peace pact, a treaty,
and a capitulation. The agreement was based on
provisions for a redress of Cuban grievances through
greater civil, political, and administrative privileges
for the Cubans, with forgetfulness of the past and
amnesty for all then under sentence for political
offences. Delay in carrying these provisions into
effect gave rise to an attempt to renew the struggle
two years later, but the effort was a failure.
Matters then quieted down for a number of years.
The Cubans waited to see what would be done.
The Spanish Governor-General still remained the supreme
power and, aside from the abolition of slavery, the
application of the Spanish Constitution and Spanish
laws to Cuba, and Cuban representation in the Cortes,
much of which was rather form than fact, the island
gained little by the new conditions. Discontent
and protest continued and, at last, broke again into
open rebellion in 1895.