a charge of violation of the maritime laws of the
United States, and was ordered to New York, for a trial
of the case. American naval officers were placed
in command, but she was in bad condition, and foundered
in a gale near Cape Fear. As far as the vessel
was concerned, the incident was closed. There
remained the question of indemnity for what Caleb
Cushing, then the American Minister to Spain, in his
communication to the Spanish authorities, denounced
as “a dreadful, a savage act, the inhuman slaughter
in cold blood, of fifty-three human beings, a large
number of them citizens of the United States, shot
without lawful trial, without any valid pretension
of authority, and to the horror of the whole civilized
world.” England also filed its claim for
the loss of British subjects, and payment was soon
after made “for the purpose of relief of the
families or persons of the ship’s company and
passengers.” In his
Cuba and International
Relations, Mr. Callahan says: “The catalogue
of irritating affairs in relation to Cuba, of which
the
Virginius was only the culmination, might
have been urged as sufficient to justify a policy
of intervention to stop the stubborn war of extermination
which had been tolerated by peaceful neighbors for
five years. Some would have been ready to advocate
intervention as a duty. The relations of Cuba
to the United States, the Spanish commercial restrictions
which placed Cuba at the mercy of Spanish monopolists,
and the character of the Spanish rule, pointed to
the conclusion that if Spain should not voluntarily
grant reforms and guarantee pacification of the island,
the United States might be compelled, especially for
future security, temporarily to occupy it and assist
in the organization of a liberal government based upon
modern views. Such action might have led to annexation,
but not necessarily; it might have led to a restoration
of Spanish possession under restrictions as to the
character of Spanish rule, and as to the size of the
Spanish army and naval force in the vicinity; more
likely it would have resulted in the independence
of Cuba under American protection.”
These are only some of the more prominent features
in fifty years of American interest in Cuba.
Throughout the entire period, the sympathies of the
American people were strongly pro-Cuban. Money
and supplies were contributed from time to time to
assist the Cubans in their efforts to effect a change
in their conditions, either through modification of
Spanish laws, or by the road of independence.
Only a minority of the Cubans sought to follow that
road at that time. The movement for independence
was not national until it was made so in 1895.
What would have happened had we, at the time of the
Ten Years’ War, granted to the Cubans the rights
of belligerents, is altogether a matter of speculation.
Such a course was then deemed politically inexpedient.
IX
CUBA’S REVOLUTIONS